В НОЯБРЕ ВЗНОСЫ ОПЛАТИЛИWelcome EM1 (SS) Christopher R. Gagnon-Orca-Peruvian Sub works with USN-Topeka Apra Harbor-Turkish Sub Launched-CPO's Position-Airspeed Offer Masts for Australia-Russian Spy Ship Warned-Report to Congress on Chinese Naval Modernization
The officers and board of Directors of the ISA/USA wish all of our members and their families a Merry Christmas/Happy Hannukah/Happy Kwanzaa and a most enjoyable New Years
John “Bud” Cunnally, President
Timothy “Tim” Fredrickson. Vice President
Ouida Ashmeade-Cunnally, Secretary
John “Jack” Messersmith, Past President
The Swedish May 2020 Congress is now accepting Credit Cards on their website http://www.57isc.com/
Join 28 other Nation’s Submariners and for fun and travel.
Consider becoming a member of the ISA-USA; you will benefit in many ways.
- Be part of a 50-year tradition of international friendships of submarine sailors. Check out www.submariners.org for the history of the International Association
- Travel to foreign countries to participate in conventions that usually include twenty-five countries in attendance.
- Establish friendships with submariners in foreign nations.
- Contribute your Submarine history and experience in our World Wide e-mail blast.
- We Cheerfully accept members that have not served but are interested in worldwide submarine activities
Lifetime membership only $50.00.
ISA/USA Membership Application. All new members of ISA/USA receive a Membership card, ISA/USA Patch, and new Vest larger Pin. Click on the attached file above.
Or our weblink below:
Send completed application and membership fee to:
John Bud Cunnally ETC (SS) Ret. USN – President
International Submariners Association of the U.S.A. (ISA/USA)
4704 Coppola Drive
Mount Dora, Fl 32757-8069
We welcome our newest ISA/USA member, EM1 (SS) Christopher R. Gagnon who lives with his wife Shan Pu in Henderson NV. Chris served onboard USS Grayback (LPSS-574), USS Barbel (SS-580) USS Darter (SS-576) and USS Dolphin (SS-555)
Stephen Hallquist posts this inspiring Submarine Navy Hymm with a tribute to Nations of the world Submarine Service and those, which are on Eternal Patrol.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKMEl4HU0fA
The U.S. Navy’s Boeing Orca underwater drone could play an offensive role in future conflicts. Writing in the highly regarded U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) blog, retired Commander Brian Dulla argues that the U.S. Navy should invest in mine-laying capabilities. It’s an arena where large drones like the Orca could have advantages.
Mine warfare feels neglected in the popular defense media. It may be perceived as old-fashioned or uninteresting. The reality can be quite different. Put yourself in the mind of a captain whose ship has just strayed into a minefield. Or the EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) diver sent to defuse the mines. Even low tech or vintage mines pose a very real threat to modern navies.
Commander Dulla’s mine proposal is innovative. Yet like many good ideas, it will seem obvious when you read it. He proposes to combines the range, autonomy, and flexibility of a UUV (uncrewed underwater vehicle) with the warhead of a mine. This allows it to be used as a moored mine that can propel itself into position, keeping the launch platform far from harm's way. It could also be used as an extra slow torpedo to target ships in the harbor. Because of its combined features, Dulla terms this concept the ‘moor-pedo.’
At the same time, underwater drones are a hot topic for the Navy. It’s a natural pairing because mine laying is dangerous to perform, especially in the enemy’s back yard. Aircraft, ships, or submarines are put in harm’s way and distracted from their primary purposes. Crewless platforms mitigate some of the inherent risks involved.
Although uncrewed air vehicles (UAVs) have become a common sight on the battlefield, development has been slower in the undersea domain. And until now, the majority of UUVs used by navies have been very small. To lay a minefield, a UUV would have to be much larger, large enough to carry a useful number of mines.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. is the first sea power to start building extra-large crewless underwater vehicles (XLUUVs). But other navies are also entering the arena, including Britain and Japan. And China, Russia, and South Korea also have large UUV projects.
Dulla proposes that the Navy’s large-displacement drones (LDUUV) could be employed. The Orca design will be even larger and, therefore, could patrol further and could carry more. The Orca is up to 85 feet long, an order of magnitude larger than anything else out there at the moment. It has a flexible payload section which is large enough to carry multiple torpedo sized payloads. Initially, these could be smaller UUVs. In the future, they could be Tomahawk cruise missiles, or as the USNI article implies, mines.
This article was written by H I Sutton from Forbes and was legally licensed through the NewsCred publisher network
US Sub Squadron, Peruvian Sub Join in Diesel-Electric Initiative
By Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Thomas Gooley, Submarine Squadron 11 Public Affairs
SAN DIEGO (NNS) -- Commander, Submarine Squadron 11 (CSS-11) and the Peruvian Submarine BAP Angamos (SS-31), a German-built Type 209 submarine (SSK), partnered to enhance and conduct training at Naval Base Point Loma as part of the Diesel-Electric Submarine Initiative (DESI) program, starting Oct. 19.
The staff of CSS-11 and the crew of the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Annapolis (SSN 757) joined their South American partners to sharpen their respective warfighting tools.
“Each year, Submarine Squadron 11 looks forward to DESI, and we are thrilled this year to be working with our Peruvian counterpart,” said Capt. Patrick Friedman, CSS-11. “By having an SSK operate and train with us, it gives us the opportunity to practice on a platform that has a similar signature to our adversaries. Not to mention, there is a great deal of diplomatic goodwill that is fostered through these engagements.”
Cmdr. Marco Goytizolo, commanding officer of Angamos, echoed Friedman’s sentiments and shared his excitement to be working alongside a “very well organized and cohesive group led by a great commander who is backed by an excellent team of professionals.”
“It is a unique experience to achieve the highest level of training and the highest level of underwater warfare, as well as strengthening our trust and support of each other through interoperability at sea and in the port between both navies,” Goytizolo said.
DESI, established in 2001 by U.S. Fleet Forces Command, is an international program led by Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic, which works to enhance the Navy's capability to operate with diesel-electric submarines by collaborating with South American navies.
“Not only are we able to strengthen our bond with our Peruvian partners, but DESI also allows for us to build on our anti-surface warfare prowess,” said Lt. Alexander Papadakos, the CSS-11 liaison officer for Angamos. “We hope that our training benefits them as much as it does us.”
During the two-month bi-lateral training, Angamos will participate in a multitude of different exercises, to include surface, air, and sub-surface anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises, a carrier strike group composite unit training exercise and a maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft exercise.
Sailors aboard Angamos will also engage in training ashore at Naval Base Point Loma. The Submarine Learning Center Detachment San Diego will host the Peruvian Sailors for classroom and practical training. This includes fighting simulated fires at the firefighting trainer and learning skills to combat flooding in the damage control team trainer.
“There is no doubt that Sailors of both navies enjoy challenging each other and working with each other through this exercise,” said Papadakos. “Whether out to sea or ashore, the goal is to complete the initiative better than we started.”
Peru continues to provide invaluable support to this premier foreign submarine exercise program. During the past 17 years, Peruvian submarines have participated in several fleet exercises and tactical development events with the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The Peruvian Navy operates a total fleet of six SSKs. Notably, Peru is the largest submarine force in South America and is the second oldest in the Western Hemisphere.
CSS-11 is based at Naval Base Point Loma and consists of five Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarines, the floating dry dock Arco (ARDM 5) and Undersea Rescue Command (URC). The squadron staff is responsible for providing training, material, and personnel readiness support for each of these units.
Get more information about the Navy from US Navy facebook or twitter.
For more news from Commander, Submarine Squadron 11, visit www.navy.mil/local/css11/.
RELATED PHOTOS
191101-N-LQ653-0355 PACIFIC OCEAN (Nov. 1, 2019) An MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter from the Magicians of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35 conducts a hoist exercise with the Peruvian navy submarine BAP Angamos (SS-31) off the coast of San Clemente Island. HSM-35 is conducting antisubmarine warfare training to maintain readiness by utilizing a live submarine. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Patrick W. Menah Jr./Released)
Our past President Jack Messersmith and friends share a visit on the BAP Angamos (SS-31) at the Submarine Base San Deigo, California.
USS Topeka (SSN 754) as it transits Apra Harbor
191220-N-OH628-0207
APRA HARBOR, Guam (Dec. 20, 2019) Naval Base Guam Harbor Security Forces escort the Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine USS Topeka (SSN 754) as it transits Apra Harbor to return to homeport, Dec. 20, 2019. Topeka is one of four forward-deployed submarines assigned to Commander, Submarine Squadron out of Polaris Point, Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Randall W. Ramaswamy/Released)
Turkish 1st Type 214 class submarine launched
Image Courtesy: T.C. Millî Savunma Bakanlığı/ Turkish National Defense Department
Turkey is pushing forward with the development of its submarine program, having witnessed its first Type 214 class submarine TCG Piri Reis hit the water on December 22 at the Gölcük Shipyard in northwestern Turkey.
The country is building a fleet of six new Type 214 air-independent propulsion submarines under a contract signed with German ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems in 2009. They are approximately 65 meters long and reach speeds of 20 knots while submerged.
Construction on the first boat in the class, TCG Piri Reis started in 2015. However, technical and financial issues delayed the program by an estimated six years and the first submarine in the class is now expected to be delivered to the navy in 202o.
The ceremony, presided over the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also included the steel cutting for the fifth submarine of the class, TCG Seydi Ali Reis.
Speaking at the ceremony, Erdoğan said that as of 2020, one submarine will go into service each year, with all six submarines from the project set to be completed by 2027.
Position the Chiefs Mess for the High-End Fight
The CPO mess is starting to refocus on technical competency, but much work remains to develop and resource chiefs for the next era of naval warfare.
By Master Chief Paul Kingsbury, U.S. Navy (Retired)
December 2019
Proceedings
Vol. 145/12/1,402
In April 2016, my article, “What Makes the CPO Mess Tick,” addressed decisions taken during the previous decade-plus that degraded the technical competence of contemporary chief petty officers (CPOs). Since then, several policy and process adjustments have occurred: revisions to selection board precepts and convening-order language; a revitalized enlisted leader development framework; a reduction of administrative pressures; and regional maintenance center efforts to rebuild fleet maintenance self-sufficiency.1
After the tragic ship collisions of 2017, the Strategic Readiness Review and the Navy’s exhaustive Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents revealed cultural and organizational deficiencies in manning, training, and equipping.2 Hard lessons have been learned, much has been discussed and written, and many adjustments have been made to rectify the deficiencies in surface warfare officer training and assignment. But, more recently, the Center for International Maritime Security ran a six-part series strongly suggesting the Navy remains unprepared and is at risk of failure in future warfighting scenarios.3
Enlisted naval professionals are invested in officer development because, as we have seen, sailors die when officer proficiency is inadequate. What is equally important, but less often questioned, is the culpability of the CPO mess. Navy leaders, both active duty and retired, continue to criticize chiefs for a lack of technical competency. Safety mishap and Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv) reports substantiate those concerns, citing a lack of supervision, failure to consistently and properly conduct preventative maintenance, inadequate systems knowledge, and lack of procedural compliance as root causes for this lack of competency. All the cited causes are within the scope of a chief’s general and specific responsibilities to positively shape and manage.
Although organizational factors outside the CPO mess play a role, adjustments are being made to refocus the senior enlisted on technical competence. But will they be enough? The InSurv and safety mishap findings support the perception that chiefs have yet to live up to the expectation that they be the top technical authorities in their ratings. Remedial work must continue in three key areas: improving CPO professional development, ensuring managerial resourcing, and strengthening CPO mess technical authority.
Professional Development
The Navy must continue to build rigor back into enlisted technical training and the advancement process, both of which have eroded since the early 2000s. Furthermore, Navy policy decisions in Washington need better fleet vetting. Decision-making and policy development by Navy staff in the Pentagon are shaped primarily by budget constraints and the need to compete for personnel talent among a younger generation with different expectations—both are important concerns, but fleet warfighting still must be the top priority.
Although many policy and process changes shaping enlisted advancement, assignment, and retention are being undertaken in support of the Sailor 2025 initiative, collaboration with fleet stakeholders will be essential if these changes are to meet the needs of both the Navy personnel system and the warfighting force.4 A policy change that appears to support Sailor 2025 may not be in the overall best interest of the fleet; worse, it may inadvertently erode fleet warfighting readiness. Technical management skill requires a solid foundation of rating subject matter expertise acquired during a career, and the advancement process and technical training are key to developing it.
Rating exams will continue to be important because they validate technical expertise and incentivize self-study. Exam content needs regular upgrading, certainly, but any recommendation to eliminate advancement exams should be forcefully resisted. Rating manuals cited as study material on most rating bibliographies must be updated—many have gone decades without a revision. And once updated, a sailor’s completion and comprehension of them should be formally graded and verified. Exam scores should be factored into selection boards, sailor-of-the-year boards, and meritorious advancement packages. The recent decision to reimplement professional military knowledge was a step in the right direction. But this requirement should be expanded to the E-8 and E-9 pay grades to enhance their organizational management skills in areas such as budgeting, manning and manpower, and normalized deviance—subjects they will need to understand as advisors on type commander and fleet staffs in areas such as maintenance, operations, and damage control.
Selection board precepts and convening orders still heavily influence CPO mess priorities in enlisted professional development, so they should continue to be used in shaping CPO mess focus, and technical management skill should feature prominently. A crew’s technical competence can be ascertained partly through examining the results of inspections, certifications, and the metrics found in routine readiness reports; as the saying goes, What gets measured, gets done. Board precepts should place a premium on enlisted evaluations and fitness reports that use this documentation to highlight how candidates have performed as technical managers. Furthermore, evaluation forms must be revised to allow more space for comments on the technical acumen of candidates and to account for rating exam scores. The weighting of collateral duties and advanced education in fitness reports and evaluations should be reduced, relieving the pressure on chiefs and first class petty officers to take on commitments that compete with their primary rating responsibilities.
Technical competence also is honed through self-study, so evaluations and advancement processes should incentivize and reward personal investment in building rating expertise. A continuing education approach similar to that used in civilian occupational fields could incentivize self-study in nonresident training courses such as the Navy Electricity and Electronics Training Series, the applicable rating manual, or general military training courses. Completing a minimum number of these courses should be weighted and captured on profile sheets, evaluations, and in selection boards.
U.S. Navy (Brett Anderson)
A chief receives a pie in the face during a fundraiser held by the chief petty officers mess on board the USS Boxer (LHD-4). To allow chiefs more time to hone their technical expertise, Navy leaders must further reduce the number of administrative burdens and superfluous time-consuming events.
Critical Resources
To be effective technical managers, chiefs need resources: people, materials, tools, and time. The fleet continues to operate without the manning or parts it needs. That was a key conclusion of the Comprehensive Review, but it was well-known long before 2017. Future budgets are being built to buy the needed resources, and work has been done to improve manning and spare parts inventory. In a fluid fiscal environment, senior Navy leaders must continue to advocate to Congress for readiness resourcing.
Time is perhaps the most critical resource. Consider how much time chiefs must spend performing their primary duty of managing the material, personnel, and operational readiness and proficiency of their teams. Time is finite, and the Navy must continue to look for ways to give the CPO mess enough of it to make the Navy run. Policies and administrative requirements must be reviewed continually for relevance and efficiency. Programs the Navy requires chiefs to manage as collateral duties should be trimmed, and only the most important revalidated by type commanders. Similarly, type commanders should review and revalidate training and certification requirements and look for efficiencies. Improvements are happening, but inspection redundancy continues to cause angst in the fleet.
Unit-level leaders also should review collateral duty lists to ensure equal distribution across a given command. Although officer promotion boards do not explicitly consider it, collateral duty management ought not be placed entirely on the backs of the senior enlisted. Commanding officers should reprioritize administrative requirements they think add no significant value to warfighting readiness, as former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson repeatedly and openly encouraged them to do.5
Another way to repurpose time spent unwisely might be to reduce or eliminate the amount spent on fundraisers and other feel-good activities. Many of these team-building functions are well-intended, but a command-hosted potluck can boost morale just as easily as an administratively burdensome holiday party with a mountain of door prizes. This is where the fleet simply cannot have it both ways—demanding relief from administrative distractions, then spending the time they have saved on superfluous activities. Chiefs must not become overly invested in “Navy Chief, Navy Pride” events. Recent changes to CPO initiation guidance that eliminated selectee fundraising were a good start, but there are still plenty of other ways to reduce the administrative pressure distracting chiefs from their primary duties.
CPO Mess Authority
Recruit Training Command has increased training rigor to enhance sailor toughness and resiliency.6 But tough sailors are not enough. The fleet also needs tough leaders who can make hard decisions for a strong Navy. Although this is anecdotal, and hopefully not widespread, I still hear about CPO mess hesitancy to “lean in” to the work of building and maintaining unit warfighting readiness. That is unacceptable.
There also is talk that some chiefs feel vulnerable to inspector general or equal opportunity complaints when they try to assert themselves—that their sailors have become too attached to formal grievance processes as the go-to tools of conflict resolution. Others believe their commanding officers side too frequently with junior sailors when a chief uses stern but appropriate disciplinary measures. Some commanding officers are so worried about command climate, they undermine their chiefs’ authority.
All the same, chiefs must accept that the “bulkhead counseling” approach of prior generations is extinct. Enabling a learning culture is important, and chiefs must work to foster it. The attributes needed to support that culture must be balanced with attributes enabling the order, authority, and safety required for success in high-end warfighting. This is asking a lot, but chiefs must find and maintain the right balance.
Although some chiefs occasionally overstep their authorities, their commanding officers should continue to back them as long as nothing they do is unsafe, illegal, or unethical. Disciplinary action against a chief should be calibrated to avoid undermining the broader CPO mess. Chiefs must know the scope of their authorities, understand the red lines, and be savvy enough to maneuver in the gray space of leadership. Often today that is not the case, and a sense of hesitancy results. Commanding officers must talk with their CPO mess early and often to align expectations on the limits of authorities regarding personnel matters.
Chiefs do not have to wait on contractor technical representatives to initiate equipment repairs. They can take the initiative and pick up the manual themselves. If they find they lack the relevant competence, they should ask technical representatives or type commander chiefs to organize training for their teams. Commanding officers should expect their chiefs will attempt to fix broken equipment, empowering them to be the leading technical authority on board, irrespective of contractual limitations on who is authorized to do the work. If chiefs are uncomfortable with that, they should bring it to the attention of the chain of command to be addressed. Sailors cannot rely on a contractor when their ship is deployed to the South China Sea and conflict starts; they will have to trust the chief.
Finally, chiefs serving in managerial support roles on fleet and type commander staffs must fulfill their end of the supporting/supported relationship. The USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) investigation report noted that the ship’s chief quartermaster recognized weaknesses in his technical competence and sought help from senior enlisted on the destroyer squadron and type commander staffs.7 Why did help fail to come? Why were so many senior enlisted, from the unit level to the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, unable to alert Navy leaders to organizational hazards––or if they did, why were their recommendations ignored or ineffective in bringing the needed support to the fleet? Chiefs serving on inspection and assessment teams and type commander and fleet staffs must actively engage to support unit-level CPO messes with knowledge and resourcing, not just certify compliance with instructions and regulations.
The Chief Petty Officer Creed and Chief Petty Officer Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles clearly capture the values, beliefs, and expectations underpinning the unique status afforded Navy CPO messes.8 The Navy culture of command by negation relies on chiefs who know the full extent of their authorities and make well-informed and lawful decisions in the absence of higher authority. If a widespread lack of CPO assertiveness has spread, that must be fixed immediately.
Today’s CPO mess is energetic and well educated––many chiefs have college degrees––but are they technically and operationally competent, and focused, where they really need to be? Last year the Navy frocked about 4,700 new chiefs. They will be among those leading a growing and changing Navy being prepared for conflict with peer adversaries. It is they, more than anyone, who will ensure the fleet’s ships and sailors are ready to fight and win in contested and denied environments. Navy chiefs always have been expected to provide results. If their strong legacy as the “backbone of the Navy” is to continue, the Navy owes them the resources, education, training, and support to fulfill their traditional duties and responsibilities.
1. MCPO Scott Kelley, “Let Your Sailors Fix It,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 144, no. 9 (September 2018): 24–27.
2. U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents (Norfolk, Virginia: 2017); Hon. Michael Bayer and ADM Gary Roughhead, USN (Ret.), Strategic Readiness Review (Washington, DC: 2017).
3. Dmitry Filipoff, “How the Fleet Forgot to Fight,” Center for International Maritime Security, 17 September 2018.
4. Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel, Sailor 2025.
5. Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs, “Navy Announces Review of All Collateral Duties, Eliminates Seven Now,” 11 July 2017.
6. RADM Michael Bernacchi, MCPO Stephen Drum, and LCDRs Jennifer Anderson and Kathleen Saul, USN, “Warrior Toughness: Making the Mind, Body, Soul Connection,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 145, no. 7 (July 2019): 46–51.
7. J. D. Simkins, “Navy Chief Gets Busted Down in Rank at McCain Collision Court-Martial,” Navy Times, 24 May 2018.
8. Chief Petty Officer Creed (Annapolis, MD: Naval Public Affairs Library, U.S. Naval Academy); Joe Campa, Chief Petty Officer Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles (Office of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, Washington, DC).
Naval Group, Airspeed to jointly offer masts for Australian submarines
Photo: Naval Group
French shipbuilder Naval Group and South Australia-based Airspeed, a specialist of composites manufacturing, have signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to respond to the design competition launched by Lockheed Martin Australia for the masts of the Royal Australian Navy’s Attack-class submarines.
Under the Future Submarine Program, a total of twelve units will be built, with the first unit slated for delivery in the early 2030s.
Naval Group has developed a new carbon composite mast which is said to offer advanced performance in terms of weight, resistance and operational efficiency, but also in terms of integration with the Attack-class platform.
“Naval Group has developed a solution that will meet all operational requirements of the Royal Australian Navy. Airspeed has impressive capabilities when it comes to composites manufacturing. If successful in the competition, we have decided to start working together as soon as the design phase to ensure these masts will be produced and maintained in South Australia,” François Romanet, Naval Group Pacific CEO, said.
“We are excited to be working on this composites project with Naval Group… If successful in the competition, the opportunity to work on the Future Submarine Program will be a defining step in the development of our company and our national sovereign capabilities and we look forward to be part of this defining national journey,” Steve Barlow, Managing Director of Airspeed, commented.
USN Warns Russian Spy ship of unsafe operations.
A Russian warship patrolling in waters close to a U.S. nuclear missile submarine base has been warned it is operating in an unsafe manner by the coastguard.
The Viktor Leonov was spotted off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia and has regularly been seen in international waters along the eastern coast since 2015.
On Sunday the Charleston coastguard issued a maritime safety information bulletin saying the ship had 'erratic movements', reported the Washington Times.
Russian warship the Viktor Leonov has been warned it is operating in an unsafe manner by the coastguard in Charleston, South Carolina (file picture of the ship in Havana, Cuba, in 2015)
As well as being close to the submarine base, the Viktor Leonov, Vishnya-class intelligence ship is also suspected of spying on undersea internet cables.
The coastguard's full safety bulletin explained the 'unsafe operation' and also warned other vessels to 'use extreme caution' when close to the Viktor Leonov.
It read: 'The United States Coast Guard has received reports indicating that the RFN Viktor Leonov (AGI-175) has been operating in an unsafe manner off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia.
'This unsafe operation includes not energizing running lights while in reduced visibility conditions, not responding to hails by commercial vessels attempting to coordinate safe passage and other erratic movements.'
When not off the eastern coast, the warship is also found patrolling in Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago.
A defense official said the US Navy's USS Mahan destroyer was operating close to the Russian ship, as reported by CNN.
The coastguard warned that the ship was 'not responding to hails by commercial vessels attempting to coordinate safe passage and other erratic movements' (file picture)
The ship, which carries high-tech surveillance equipment and weaponry, AK-630 rapid-fire cannons and surface-to-air missiles, was also spotted just 70 miles off the coast of Delaware in February 2017.
At the time an official said: 'It's not a huge concern, but we are keeping our eyes on it'.
THE RUSSIAN SPY VESSEL VIKTOR LEONOV
The Vishnya class intelligence-gathering ship went into service in the Black Sea in 1988 before it was transferred seven years later to the northern fleet.
It is named after Second World War Soviet sailor Viktor Leonov.
Ship measures 300 feet long and 47.5 feet wide.
It has a crew of 200 sailors carries high-tech electronic surveillance equipment and weaponry, AK-630 rapid-fire cannons and surface-to-air missiles
The intelligence ship also patrolled near the U.S. nuclear missile submarine base in Kings Bay, Georgia, in 2014.
The Department of Defense suspected that may have been part of an intelligence-gathering operation.
In a throwback to the Cold War, the spy ship also caused a stir after unexpectedly docking in Havana on the eve of historic talks between the U.S. and Cuba the following year.
There was nothing stealthy about the arrival of the Leonov, which was moored to a pier in Old Havana where cruise ships often dock.
But the visit was not officially announced by Cuban authorities. The timing also raised eyebrows as it came on the eve of historic U.S-Cuba talks aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations.
U.S. officials in Washington played down the presence of the Russian vessel, saying it was perfectly legal and not at all out of the ordinary.
'It's not unprecedented. It's not unusual. It's not alarming,' a defense official told AFP news agency.
The ship went into service in the Black Sea in 1988 before it was transferred seven years later to the northern fleet, according to Russian media.
Report to Congress on Chinese Naval Modernization
December 23, 2019 10:42 AM
The following is the Dec. 20, 2019 Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.
From the report
In an international security environment of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for roughly 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War—and forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific.
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.
China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; for achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; for enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); for defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; for displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and for asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major world power.
Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of a Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
The U.S. Navy in recent years has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval modernization effort. Among other things, the U.S. Navy has shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific; assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft and its best personnel to the Pacific; maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the Pacific; increased the planned future size of the Navy; initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons; begun development of new operational concepts (i.e., new ways to employ Navy and Marine Corps forces) for countering Chinese maritime A2/AD forces; and signaled that the Navy in coming years will shift to a more-distributed fleet architecture that will feature a smaller portion of larger ships, a larger portion of smaller ships, and a substantially greater use of unmanned vehicles. The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. Navy is responding appropriately to China’s naval modernization effort.
Download the document here.
Thanks, and have a Happy Holiday season
Bud
John Bud Cunnally ETC (SS) Ret. USN – President
International Submariners Association of the U.S.A. (ISA/USA)
4704 Coppola Drive
Mount Dora, Fl 32757-8069
352-729-4097 Home
352-638-1955 Cell
