В НОЯБРЕ ВЗНОСЫ ОПЛАТИЛИRoyal Navy Sub's Newsletter-2020 National Convention-Polaris Revolution-Bob Perkins in South Georgia-UK's Diving Tower-Indonesia New Sub-Russian Nuclear Weapons-Virginia 2 for 4-Pirasts of the Seven Seas-Yasen-Kazan Class-Chiefs message-Indian Nuke progra
Date: 26 Jan 2020
ISA/USA Website: www.ISAUSA.Org
We invite the World’s Submariners to join us at the USSVI NATIONAL CONVENTION
Tucson, AZ
August 23 – August 30, 2020
Welcome To Tucson, Shipmates!
Tucson Base and Perch Base
are your hosts for the 2020 USSVI National Convention
Hotel Registration Convention Registration
Hilton El Conquistador, 10000 North Oracle Road, Tucson, AZ 85704
We have a group rate of $96.00 per night per room.
Attendees can also contact the hotel reservations department directly at 520-544-1155 and use code USSVI.
The cut-off date for the Room Block is July 20, 2020.
Reservations made after this date may be made at the Convention rate based on room availability.
Our annual convention is one of the largest and most exciting annual gatherings of submarine veterans in the U.S. This event offers attendees the environment, the setting and the unique opportunity to meet with fellow submariners to exchange ideas, reminisce and keep up to date on important information. See our web page at https://ussviconvention.org/2020/
The Swedish May 2020 Congress is now accepting Credit Cards on their website http://www.57isc.com/
Join 28 other Nation’s Submariners and for fun and travel.
Consider becoming a member of the ISA-USA; you will benefit in many ways.
- Be part of a 50-year tradition of international friendships of submarine sailors. Check out www.submariners.org for the history of the International Association
- Travel to foreign countries to participate in conventions that usually include twenty-five countries in attendance.
- Establish friendships with submariners in foreign nations.
- Contribute your Submarine history and experience in our World Wide e-mail blast.
- We Cheerfully accept members that have not served but are interested in worldwide submarine activities
Lifetime membership only $50.00.
ISA/USA Membership Application. All new members of ISA/USA receive a Membership card, ISA/USA Patch, and new larger Vest Pin. Click on the attached file above.
Or our weblink below:
Send completed application and membership fee to:
John Bud Cunnally ETC (SS) Ret. USN – President
International Submariners Association of the U.S.A. (ISA/USA)
4704 Coppola Drive
Mount Dora, Fl 32757-8069
Welcome two new ISA/USA members, ET1(SS) Buchannon Crouch Jr., who lives in Tucson. AZ with ISA/USA member Ada M. Adams. Buck served on board the USS Narwhal (SSN-671).
And Ada Adams, Buck’s partner in life.
Polaris: A True Revolution
The Polaris missile program was complex, its technologies new and unproven, and its basic concept—launching missiles from beneath the ocean surface—was radical. Yet its missiles and systems went to sea ahead of schedule and proved extremely successful.
By Norman Polmar
June 2006
Proceedings
Vol. 132/6/1,240
Developing a new weapon system in the United States today takes about 10 to 20 years. Some, such as the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft and the Joint Strike Fighter, have had extremely lengthy development times. But one of the most revolutionary and complex naval weapons of the Cold War had a development period of just over four years.
Fifty years ago, the U.S. Navy embarked on a program to send the Jupiter ballistic missile to sea in merchant-type ships as a strategic deterrent. Some Navy studies were also addressing the feasibility of surfaced submarines launching missiles. But, on 15 November 1960, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598), the first U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, went to sea on deterrent patrol with 16 Polaris missiles. This event occurred in record time.
J. M. CAIELLA
The evolution of the Polaris missile to its ultimate incarnation, the Trident D-5, spanned three decades, yet the program’s significance is hidden behind the numbers of the first three missiles. The Polaris A-1 went to sea ahead of schedule, and within four years, the A-3 had more than double the range.
In the summer of 1956, the U.S. Navy’s leadership was strongly opposed to taking ballistic missiles to sea from a cultural viewpoint. First, from the late 1940s, both the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Ordnance were—separately—developing cruise missiles that could be launched from submarines against land targets; neither bureau wished to divert scarce resources to a new ballistic missile program. Second, the Navy had lost the B-36 bomber-versus-carrier controversy to the Air Force in the late 1940s. That loss had cost the Navy prestige and cancellation of the first postwar aircraft carrier, the United States (CVA-58).1 The Navy’s leadership wanted to avoid another inter-service battle over strategic missiles. Indeed, Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations from 1953 to 1955, had placed restrictions on Navy officers advocating sea-based ballistic missiles. There was another issue that was very real—the fear of having to pay for such new weapons out of the regular Navy budget.2
Navy opposition to a sea-based ballistic missile force ended when Admiral Arleigh A. Burke became Chief of Naval Operations in August 1955. According to his biographer, “Burke’s most significant initiative during his first term [1955-1957] was his sponsorship, in the face of considerable opposition, of a high-priority program to develop a naval intermediate-range ballistic missile.”3
Fearing that the project would be given low priority within the Navy and doomed to failure if left to the existing Navy bureaucracy, Admiral Burke established the Special Projects Office (SPO) to provide a “vertical” organization to direct the sea-based missile project separate from the existing technical bureaus (e.g., Bureau of Ships). Heretofore, all major naval technical developments, as well as production, had been directed by the technical bureaus, an organizational structure that dated from 1842. In these actions, Burke was strongly supported by Secretary of the Navy Charles S. Thomas.4
The Polaris missile system that went to sea in the George Washington in 1960 truly was a revolutionary weapon system. The term “revolutionary” denotes a weapon system that makes a significant technical advance in a given area or has a major impact in combat or on defense policy. Although the Soviet Union had sent ballistic missiles to sea before Polaris, the American weapon system was revolutionary in three spheres: submarine, missile, and operational concept.
U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive
A Polaris missile, inside its protective casing, is prepared for loading in the USS George Washington.
On 8 November 1955, the Secretary of Defense established the joint Army-Navy intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) program based on the Army’s planned Jupiter missile. The sea-based Jupiter program, given top national priority along with the Air Force’s Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and Army’s Jupiter, progressed rapidly toward sending the missile to sea in converted merchant ships, each to carry three Jupiter IRBMs. (There appears to have been some “magic” in the number three; the first Soviet purpose-built, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) submarines of the Project 629/Golf and Project 658/Hotel classes also carried three missiles.) During 1956, a schedule was developed to send the first IRBM-armed merchant ships to sea in 1959. Some studies were also addressing the feasibility of submarines launching the Jupiter IRBM from the surface, also with three missiles per boat.
But the Navy had severe misgivings about the use of highly volatile liquid propellants on board ship, and studies were initiated into solid-propellant missiles.5 Solid propellants had a low specific impulse—less thrust than comparable liquid-propellant rockets—a major shortcoming. The biggest boost for solid propellants came in mid-1956 when scientists determined that it was feasible to miniaturize thermo-nuclear warheads. Dr. Edward Teller suggested in the summer of 1956 that a 400-pound warhead could provide the explosive force of one weighing 5,000 pounds. The Atomic Energy Commission in September 1956 estimated that a small nuclear warhead would be available by 1965 with an even chance of being ready by 1963.
Thus, in the summer of 1956, the Special Projects Office began working on a smaller, solid-propellant weapon for submarine use. The smaller warhead, coupled with the parallel development of higher specific impulse, solid-fuel propellants permitted a break from the Army’s Jupiter program in December 1956, the formal initiation of the Polaris SLBM program, and a shift from surface ships to submarines as the launch platform.
The Submarine
There was little remarkable in the initial SSBN design—basically, that of the highly successful Skipjack (SSN-585) was “stretched.” This added 130 feet in length to permit the installation of special navigation, missile control, and other mission support equipment as well as 16 launch tubes for the 28-foot-long Polaris missiles. The result was the largest submarine built by any nation to that time, except for the nuclear-propelled, radar picket Triton (SSRN-586). That submarine, however, was a one-of-a-kind craft, conceived by then-Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, to test a two-reactor propulsion plant.
Significantly, the admirals involved in the Polaris project feared Admiral Rickover’s participation “would lead to the domination of the new project” by his office.6 Admiral Burke excluded him by simply directing that the Skipjack’s S5W powerplant would be used. Admiral Rickover did gain one concession: the requirement for Polaris submarines to operate under the Arctic ice pack was deleted from the SSBN requirements. (Two years later, however, Admiral Rickover would tell a congressional committee that the Polaris submarines “will be able to operate under the polar ice cap.”)
Among the most important submarine components were the fire control and navigation systems. The latter was particularly critical because of the range of the missile and the need for the submarine to remain submerged, except for masts and antennas raised periodically. Recalling that this was in the period before the availability of navigation satellites, the Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS) developed for the Polaris program was also a remarkable technological achievement. SINS could provide accurate position information regardless of surface and atmospheric conditions.
No less important were improved life support systems needed to provide oxygen and potable water while submerged with a sealed atmosphere for a crew of 150 to 160 officers and enlisted men for 60 to 70 days. Those were vital for an effective submarine.
Thus, at the time of their construction, the Polaris SLBM submarines were the largest and most complex submarines yet built by any nation.
The Missile
The principal criterion for judging a warship should be its weapons payload. Here the Polaris submarine was truly revolutionary. The initial Soviet SLBM submarines each carried two or three missiles, the latter number also being planned for the U.S. Jupiter IRBM-armed merchant ships and possibly submarines.7
The decision was made early in the program to arm the Polaris submarine with a large number of missiles—16 being the ultimate number. While some participants in the project argued that putting “so many eggs in one basket” would put at risk a large number of missiles if a submarine were located and sunk, the estimated survivability of the submarines coupled with the large numbers of missiles envisioned—several hundred—made the 16-tube submarine a cost-effective design. The installation of 16 missiles in a single submarine was also a major feat in ship design, especially when one considers that the first Polaris submarines were modified from a smaller attack submarine design.
The Polaris missiles themselves were the world’s first long-range missiles with solid-propellant rockets. The initial A-1 missile’s range, however, severely restricted the operating ocean area of the SLBM submarines if they were to target inland locations such as Moscow. The 1,200-nautical mile A-1 missile was considered an interim weapon from the outset of the solid-propellant program, with longer-range versions already in development. The A-1’s range limitation was accepted to compress the deployment schedule. The A-1 went on patrol in the George Washington in November 1960; the 1,500-nautical mile A-2 version went on patrol in June 1962 in the USS Ethan Allen (SSBN-608), and the 2,500-nautical mile A-3 in the USS Daniel Webster (SSBN-626) in September 1964. Thus, within a period of four years, the missile’s range more than doubled. All three versions of the Polaris had approximately the same dimensions.
The underwater launch of the missile, permitting the submarine to remain completely submerged during the process, created additional technical problems, among them development of a means to have the submarine remains virtually motionless in the water column, eject the missile from its launch tube, propel the missile to the surface (for its rocket engine to ignite above the surface), and compensation for the loss of weight when a missile was launched, a critical factor in submarine depth control.
Subsequently, 31 of the 41 Polaris submarines were rearmed with the more capable Poseidon C-3 and 12 of those submarines with the Trident I C-4 missiles, further demonstrating the flexibility and excellence of the Polaris systems design.
The Operational Concept
Early in the development of the Polaris system, the decision was made to operate the submarines with two complete crews (each of about 160 men) to permit the maximum amount of submarine time on deterrent patrol. This concept was labeled “Blue and Gold,” with the first crew (Blue) taking the submarine to sea for a patrol of some 60 days. Upon returning to port, the second crew, together with the first, would have a period of about 15 to 30 days to replenish the submarine and make ready for another patrol. Then the second (Gold) crew would take the submarine to sea for a 60-day patrol.
The crew ashore would have about 45 days for leave and training (on simulators). This Blue-Gold crew concept has worked successfully for the 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines, permitting more than half of the total force to be at sea at any given time. (From a mathematical viewpoint, the at-sea time should have been approximately 3:1; however, the submarines periodically underwent overhauls, had missile test periods, etc., that reduced time at sea on patrol.)
For those submarines operating from the overseas bases established in Holy Loch, Scotland; Rota, Spain; and Guam in the Marianas, the crews were flown back and forth to their home bases in the United States.
The Polaris project was undertaken on several promises—that smaller warheads could be developed and produced, and that solid-propellant propulsion would work. The development time of the Polaris SLBM system—that is, the submarines, missiles, navigation gear, life-support systems, training devices, and a multitude of other components—was truly remarkable. It has probably not been equaled since with any U.S. weapon system of similar complexity.
U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive
The first Polaris missile submarine, USS George Washington, is launched at Groton, Connecticut, 9 June 1959.
To ensure that all of the pieces fit together on schedule, Rear Admiral William F. Raborn Jr. adopted the then-innovative Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) scheduling system. The biographer of the Polaris program observed, “The Special Projects Office has gained an international reputation for the innovativeness and effectiveness of the management control system it has employed. . . ”8
As the Polaris system was being developed compromises were made in schedule and performance to achieve earlier operational dates. In late 1957 the Navy plan called for six Polaris submarines to be at sea by 1965. George Washington went to sea in late 1960, and there were six Polaris submarines operational by mid-1962 with the sixth, the Ethan Allen, carrying the upgraded A-2 missile; all 41 submarines were completed by 1967.
As a result of concerns over indications of massive Soviet developments in bomber and missile technology, in the mid-1950s, the United States initiated the Polaris SLBM and land-based Minuteman ICBM. The Polaris submarines, when deployed, were completely invulnerable to the existing Soviet countermeasures. This survivability, according to then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, meant that “the SLBM force contributes to crisis stability. The existence of a survivable, at-sea ballistic missile force decreases the Soviet incentives to procure additional counterforce weapons and to plan attacks on United States soil since such attacks would not eliminate our ability to retaliate.”9 In response to the Polaris, the Soviets initiated several major antisubmarine programs.
The Polaris SLBM was a revolutionary weapon. First, it involved major technical advances with respect to submarines and missiles with the almost unprecedented growth potential of the system—from Polaris A-1 to the A-2, A-3, Poseidon C-3, and Trident C-4 missiles—being carried by essentially the same submarine design. Second, the missile provided a highly survivable strategic system, which had a major impact on U.S. defense policy. Third, it was developed in a remarkably short time.
If one looks at the subsequent Trident SLBM system, the concept was approved for development in the early 1970s with the first submarine being completed in November 1981—ten years later, and at a much slower construction rate than originally planned. Although the development time was significantly longer than the Polaris, one can demonstrate that the Trident was far less innovative than its forebearers—most elements of the new system were improvements of previous SLBM components. The longer gestation period appears to have been caused by the enlarged Department of Defense and Navy bureaucracies, the lack of the highest national priorities for SLBM development in the 1980s akin to those of the “missile gap” period, and the extensive involvement of Admiral Rickover in the Trident effort.
The final factor in the lessons of Polaris is why it was developed.
As astutely observed by Dr. Harvey M. Sapolsky, the guiding elements were the need—i.e., the Soviet threat—coupled with technological opportunity. Atomic Energy Commission historians Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan note that fearing the Air Force’s Thor missile would be operational by 1960 and a reduction in defense funding, and Admiral Burke “was now [1957] hoping the Navy could catch up with Thor by having the first Polaris submarine ready by late 1959 or early 1960.”10
The reasons for the Polaris development were important and led to its being a truly revolutionary weapon system.
1. The United States (CVA-58) was laid down at Newport News Shipbuilding on 18 April 1949 and canceled by the secretary of Defense on 23 April 1949. She was to have had a full-load displacement of approximately 80,000 tons.
2. Initially, additional funds were provided to the Navy for SLBM development, but by 1959 the Navy was forced to cancel the development of the Regulus II land-attack cruise missile and the P6M Seamaster flying-boat bomber and to delay construction of an aircraft carrier to help pay for the Polaris project. At the time, all three of these programs were viewed by the Navy as strategic strike weapons.
3. Dr. David A. Rosenberg, "Arleigh Albert Burke" in Robert William Love, Jr. (ed.). The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 277. Admiral Burke served an unprecedented six years as CNO, from 1955 to 1961.
4. The organizational/management history of SPO is found in Dr. Harvey M. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). Also see Graham Spinardi, from Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and D. A. Paolucci, USN (Ret.), "The Development of Navy Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems," in "Naval Review," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1970, pp. 204-223.
5. A Polaris warhead weight of 600 pounds (compared to a Jupiter warhead of 1,600 pounds with a similar explosive yield) is cited in Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 309. The lower weight has been cited in other documents.
6. Hewlett and Duncan, Nuclear Navv, p. 309.
7. The early Soviet SSB/SSBN programs are described in N. Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore, Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004), pp. 103-114.
8. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development, p. 94. PERT was more of an innovation in form than in substance.
9. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979," 2 February 1978, p. 110.
10. Hewlett and Duncan, Nuclear Navy, p. 314.
Bob Perkins sends this about his visit to South Georgia.
Hi Bud, I did an Antarctica cruise in November, and we visited the beautiful island of South Georgia. We stopped at Grytviken, which is an abandoned Norwegian whale processing center that has been closed since the early 1920s. South Georgia is a UK protected island and is where the famous explorer Shackleton reached on an epic voyage across the violent seas after his ship was broken up when trapped in the ice.
During the Falklands War, the Argentinians sent a submarine to Grytviken, and when the UK retook the island and captured the submarine, one Argentine sailor was mistakenly killed by a UK officer who thought he was reaching for a weapon. The British buried the sailor with full military honors. After the war was over, this officer felt so bad he contacted the sailor's parents and went to Argentina to beg their forgiveness, and they did forgive him. The fog of war. This sailor is buried at the small cemetery at Grytviken, along with Shackleton. I drank a toast at the gravesite of both of these men. The above photo is me at the grave of the Argentine submarine sailor.
Thanks, Bob Perkins
The UK’s Royal Navy sees the end of their diving tower.
Indonesia’s 1st locally built submarine completes diving trials
Photo: PT PAL
The Indonesian Navy’s third Nagapasa-class submarine KRI Alugoro (405) has completed the nominal diving depth (NDD) phase of the sea trials.
The trials, during which the submarine dived to a depth of 250 meters, were conducted in the Bali Sea, and in the waters off East Java on January 20, 2020, Indonesian shipbuilder PT PAL said.
Launched in April 2019, KRI Alugoro was assembled in Indonesia under a transfer of technology agreement with South Korean shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME).
The new building is planned to be handed over to the navy in December 2020, according to PT PAL.
Indonesia’s first two Nagapasa-class boats were built at DSME’s shipyard in Okpo, Geoje, and delivered in August 2017, and April 2018.
The country has also signed a contract with DSME worth an estimated USD 1 billion for the construction of an additional three 1,400-ton submarines in the class.
The Nagapasa-class submarines are 61 meters long, displace 1,400 tons, and are operated by a crew of 40 sailors. They have an operating range of approximately 10,000 nautical miles and reach a speed of 21 knots while submerged.
Naval Today Staff
Report to Congress on Russian Nuclear Weapons
January 7, 2020, 9:24 AM
The following is the Jan. 2, 2020 Congressional Research Service report, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization.
From the report
Russia’s nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems—including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines, and aircraft while developing new types of delivery systems. Although Russia’s number of nuclear weapons has declined sharply since the end of the Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory.
Doctrine and Deployment
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union valued nuclear weapons for both their political and military attributes. While Moscow pledged that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, many analysts and scholars believed the Soviet Union integrated nuclear weapons into its warfighting plans. After the Cold War, Russia did not retain the Soviet “no first use” policy, and it has revised its nuclear doctrine several times to respond to concerns about its security environment and the capabilities of its conventional forces. When combined with military exercises and Russian officials’ public statements, this evolving doctrine seems to indicate that Russia has potentially placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and may threaten to use them during regional conflicts. This doctrine has led some U.S. analysts to conclude that Russia has adopted an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, where it might threaten to use nuclear weapons if it were losing a conflict with a NATO member, to convince the United States and its NATO allies to withdraw from the conflict. Russian officials, along with some scholars and observers in the United States and Europe, dispute this interpretation; however, concerns about this doctrine have informed recommendations for changes in the U.S. nuclear posture.
Russia’s current modernization cycle for its nuclear forces began in the early 2000s and is likely to conclude in the 2020s. Also, in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was developing new types of nuclear systems. While some see these weapons as a Russian attempt to achieve a measure of superiority over the United States, others note that they likely represent a Russian response to concerns about emerging U.S. missile defense capabilities. These new Russian systems include, among others, a heavy ICBM with the ability to carry multiple warheads, a hypersonic glide vehicle, an autonomous underwater vehicle, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile. The hypersonic glide vehicle, carried on an existing long-range ballistic missile, entered service in late 2019.
Arms Control Agreements
Over the years, the United States has signed bilateral arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and then Russia that have limited and reduced the number of warheads carried on their nuclear delivery systems. Early agreements did little to reduce the size of Soviet forces, as the Soviet Union developed and deployed missiles with multiple warheads. However, the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, combined with financial difficulties that slowed Russia’s nuclear modernization plans, sharply reduced the number of deployed warheads in the Russian force. The 2010 New START Treaty added modest reductions to this record but still served to limit the size of the Russian force and maintain the transparency afforded by the monitoring and verification provisions in the treaty.
Congressional Interest
Some Members of Congress have expressed growing concerns about the challenges Russia poses to the United States and its allies. In this context, Members of Congress may address a number of questions about Russian nuclear forces as they debate the U.S. nuclear force structure and plans for U.S. nuclear modernization. Congress may review debates about whether the U.S. modernization programs are needed to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent, or whether such programs may fuel an arms race with Russia. Congress may also assess whether Russia will be able to expand its forces in ways that threaten U.S. security if the United States and Russia do not extend the New START Treaty through 2026. Finally, Congress may review the debates within the expert community about Russian nuclear doctrine when deciding whether the United States needs to develop new capabilities to deter Russian use of nuclear weapons.
The full document is at:
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6598970/Russia-s-Nuclear-Weapons-Doctrine-Forces-and.pdf
The Virginia Class Program: “2 for 4 in 12”
The SSN-774 Virginia Class submarine was introduced in the 1990s as a Clinton-era reform that was intended to take some of the SSN-21 Seawolf Class’ key design and technology advances, and place them in a smaller, less heavily-armed, and less expensive platform. The resulting submarine would have learned some of the Seawolf program’s negative procurement lessons while performing a capably inland attack, naval attack, special forces, and shallow water roles. In the end, the Seawolf Class became a technology demonstrator program that was canceled at three ships, and the Virginia Class became the naval successor to America’s famed SSN-688 Los Angeles Class.
The Virginia Class program was supposed to reach two submarines per year by 2002, removing it from the unusual joint construction approach between General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding – but that goal has been pushed back to 2012 in progressive planning budgets.
In FY 2005 dollars, SSN-21 submarines cost between $3.1-3.5 billion each. According to Congressional Research Service report, #RL32418 and the Navy are working toward a goal of shaving FY05$ 400 million from the cost of each Virginia Class boat, and buying two boats in FY2012 for a combined cost of $4.0 billion in FY 2005 dollars – a goal referred to as “2 for 4 in 12”. In real dollars, subject to inflation, that means about $2.6 billion per sub in 2012 and $2.7 billion in 2013. The Navy believes that moving from the current joint construction arrangement will shave FY05$ 200 million from the cost of each submarine, leaving another FY05$ 200 million (about $220 million) to be saved through ship design and related changes.
The most obvious change is the switch from 12 vertical launch tubes, to 12 missiles in 2 tubes that use technology from the Ohio Class special forces/ strike SSGN program. Virginia’s hull has a smaller cross-section than the converted ballistic missile SSGNs, so the “6-shooters” will be shorter and a bit wider. Nevertheless, they will share a great deal of common technology, allowing innovations on either platform to be incorporated into the other submarine class during major maintenance milestones. Net savings are about $8 million to program baseline costs.
The other big change you can see in the above diagram is switching from an air-backed sonar sphere to a water-backed Large Aperture Bow (LAB) array. Eliminating the hundreds of SUBSAFE penetrations that help maintain required pressure in the air-backed sonar sphere will save approximately $11 million per hull, and begins with the FY 2012 boats (SSNs 787-788).
The LAB Array has two primary components: the passive array, which will provide improved performance, and a medium-frequency active array. It utilizes transducers from the SSN-21 Seawolf Class that are designed to last the life of the hull. This is rather parred for the course, as the Virginia Class’ was created in the 1990s to incorporate key elements of the $4 billion Seawolf Class submarine technologies into a cheaper boat.
The SUBSAFE eliminations, plus the life-of-the-hull transducers, will help to reduce the submarines’ life cycle costs as well by removing moving parts that require maintenance, eliminating possible points of failure and repair, and removing the need for transducer replacements in drydock.
The bow redesign is not limited to these changes, however, and includes 25 associated redesign efforts. These are estimated to reduce construction costs by another $20 million per hull beginning with the FY 2012 submarine.
With the $19 million ($11 + 8) from the LAB array and Vertical Payload, and the $20 million from the associated changes, General Dynamics is $39 million toward the $200 million baseline costs goal of “2 for 4 in 12”. While the changes themselves will begin with the FY 2009 ship, the savings are targeted at FY 2012 because of the learning curve required as part of the switch. Recent discussions concerning an earlier shift to 2 submarines per year would result in faster production of the Block III submarines but would be unlikely to make a huge difference to that learning curve.
January 17/20: Block V Lockheed Martin won a $19.4 million contract modification to exercise options for the procurement of eight multi-function modular masts for new-construction Virginia Class submarine Block V hulls. Virginia Class subs are designed for a broad spectrum of open-ocean and littoral missions, including anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering operations. The Block V submarines include some significant upgrades and changes when compared to the Virginia-class submarines already built. Work will take place in New Hampshire and New York. The estimated completion date is in September 2023.
Jack Messerschmitt sends this:
I Remember
Here's to us, one and all
Who heard the message and answered the call
To break away from the old mainstream and live our lives on a submarine. Sub School gave us the chance to pass the test
To declare that we were The Best of the Best. When we left New London with orders in hand
We all headed out on different courses for distant, faraway lands. Some went East coast some went West
But no matter where you ended up, your first boat's the best.
You reported on board not knowing what to think. But now you're known to all as a nub and a <link.
You learn about Tradition and learn about Pride, You learn about Honor and the men who have died,
You learn about the heritage that's been passed on to you Because now you're considered one of the crew.
You study that boat from bow to stem
From the conning tower to the bilges, it's your duty to learn
Where and what makes that boat go, how it operates and in what direction it flows How to charge those batteries and keep them alive or how to rig the boat for dive Draw those systems fore and aft, blow the shitters, Check the draft
These are duties that you must glean when you live your life on a submarine When you've learned all there is to know about your boat
You show 'em you know it, by your walkthrough vote. You go before the Qua! Board, card in hand
Where they question and grill you to beat the band And when you think you can take no more
They tell you to wait just outside the door. For what seems like eons, Time stands still And when they call you in, you feel quite ill! But they congratulate you for doing so good And welcome you into their Brotherhood.
The right of passage declares that you must drink your "fish". And the tacking on the process is not something you wish, But you wear those dolphins on your chest with pride
Because down deep in your heart, you know you're Qualified.
It seems like yesterday; it seems like a dream That I truly lived on a submarine
Most Boats are gone, a memory of time
I wonder what happened to that crew of mine? The Old Boats that are left are all museums
And even if you rode them, you have to pay admission to see them. So here's to us, those that remember
Who rode the boats out in all kinds of weather To that past, present, and even the future
To those young, hardy lads who still love adventure
So let's lift our glasses and have a toast
To the memory of those daring young sailors and their undersea boats.
Dick Murphy IC3-SS USS Tiru SS-416
(Given at the 1st USS Tiru SS 416 Reunion Charleston, South Carolina October 29, 2003)
Steel Boats, Iron Men and their stories (plus a bit more)
Pirates of the Seven Seas – Those Dastardly Submariners
Posted on December 26, 2019, by Mister Mac
1920
The new decade had begun. The echoes of the war were still reverberating in society with the recent return of so many of the men from overseas that had seen the ravages of that horrific conflict.
The emergence of the submarine as a frightful weapon spawned many stories in the press. People across the nation had been told many stories about the little undersea creatures and what they had been able to do. Some of the stories were true, but most were wild concoctions designed to sell newspapers. The unintended side effect was that people genuinely did not understand the nature of the new weapon.
It was dastardly and evil. It brutally killed men (as if killing men in any fashion was somehow not cruel). The newspapers of 1919 and 1920 were filled with fantastic stories that had been kept in the dark during the worst parts of the war. The strangulation of the sea lanes supplying Great Britain nearly brought the island to its knees. The same can be said of the loss of shipping to the combined German and Austrian countries. Starvation was a common thing in the continent towards the end of the war.
But now the world was at peace. The Hun had been licked. The future wars in the Pacific were not even seriously considered yet. All that the planners knew was that the little submarines were going to be a part of the future. Just what part, no one could predict yet.
First, the public would have to be educated. The myths of the conflict would need to be dissembled. The victorious powers wanted to squash this new threat and get back to business. That business was Britannia ruling the waves. The fear that the new technology drove into the hearts of England was real and dangerous. A smaller nation with limited resources could replicate the submarine threat and challenge its global dominance.
The United States Navy was not so intimidated. They had shown that the submarine could be held in check. The huge industrial might of the USA had assembled large quantities of new submarines, and many more were on the building blocks on both coasts. The imagination of naval designers was piqued with the arrival of the captured German submarines.
The fight of the century was about to switch from the sea lanes and battlefields to conference rooms and back rooms. The London Naval treaty was going to change the course of history, and submarines were in the crosshairs.
Today’s article from the New York Herald is one of many written and distributed to help the public learn about the war just completed.
One of the unknown truths was that submarines, even with the limited amount of technology of the day, were one of the secret weapons in stopping other submarines.
Buried in this article is one of the few references that was allowed to leak into the public. Towards the end of the war, submarines learned how to hunt and kill other submarines.
This was a large step in identifying the future role of submarines in open ocean warfare.
The New York Herald. (New York [N.Y.]), 04 Jan. 1920. Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers. Lib. of Congress.
ILLUSIONS ABOUT SUBMARINES IN WAR DISPELLED BY FACTS DISCLOSED SINCE PEACE CAME
Suggestion That Use of Under-water Craft Should be Forbidden by international Law Finds Little Support as the Truth Becomes Better Known
(By the Herald’s Naval Correspondent.)
London, December 5. – The facts and figures which have been officially disclosed recently tend to clear up much of the uncertainty which has enveloped the work of the submarines. It is now manifest that the prejudice’s aroused against them by the illegal uses to which the Germans put their U-boats has been dissipated the revelations concerning the rightful employment of under-water craft In the war, and by the facts which show the submarine war upon commerce in its rightful proportions.
The suggestion that the use of submarines should be forbidden by International law finds very little support In any quarter, particularly as an impression prevails that there may come a time when all warships except, perhaps, the very largest, should be given powers of submersion. Total abolition is altogether different from controlling the use of submarines by International regulations. It has even been proposed that the League of Nations should adopt the principle that the illegal use of submarines shall deprive officers and men serving in them of the status of lawful combatants, thus rendering them liable to be treated as pirates. The lesson of the war on this point is not only must commerce destruction be made illegal, but unsafe for a nation adopting it.
Among other false ideas that have gone overboard is that the submarine was winning the war. Information now available concerning the growing success of the anti-submarine measures toward the end of hostilities proves conclusively the inaccuracy of such a belief. Out of the total losses sustained by the U-boats in their campaigns, for example, nearly ten percent were inflicted during the last three months of the war. There were periods during 1918 when the Allies were destroying twice as many German submarines as in the previous year, although the enemy had fewer effective boats at work. This was in addition to the numbers which came to grief in the huge American and British mine barrages or by other passive agencies, the figures for which also showed progressive increases.
It also is now disclosed that several of the appliances which had come into use late in the war were only just beginning to attain their full efficiency. Naturally, it took time for inventions to be made practicable, to be manufactured in the required numbers, and for personnel to be trained in their use. Incidentally, Admiral Arial Sir Percy Scott thinks that too much time was spent in endeavoring to attain perfection before an appliance was adopted for use and he alleges that one of the most successful weapons against the submarines, the depth charge, could have been ready with Its ejecting howitzer at the end of 1914 instead of in 1916 had the Admiralty not been so keen to Improve on the original suggestion.
Another matter of importance is the relation of the losses to the number of boats in use on either side. The loss of British submarines in the war, which was fifty-four from all causes, may seem high until it is remembered that well over two hundred boats were at one time in service. There were seventy-six already built before the war and 146 more were constructed during hostilities. Besides the fifty fours lost on service, there were several scrapped or otherwise disposed of, and the number remaining on the effective list at the armistice was 137. The proportion of war losses to the total bots in service was, therefore, about twenty-five percent. Considered in relation to other warship types, this was heavy – more so than in any other class.
But consider the much heavier ratio of loss among the German U-boats. There were twenty-eight of these complete when war was declared, and during hostilities, 360 were built, giving a total of 388. When the Germans were required to make a full surrender of all submarines at the armistice, there were able too to muster only 159, so that, allowing for a score or more having been scrapped during 1914-1918, their losses during hostilities would amount to well over two hundred. They have, in fact, been officially computed at 202 boats reckoning only definite losses. The proportion of loss to the total boats employed is therefore somewhere between fifty and sixty percent, even on the increased submarine establishment developed and maintained by the Berlin authorities for the attack of commerce.
Statistics also show that the effect of antisubmarine warfare was progressive in its character and value. The number of U-boats put down during 1915 was surpassed by fifty percent during 1916; in 1917, the record was double that of 1916, and for the ten months of 1918, there was an increase of thirty percent again. The average rate of loss among the German submarines had increased from about one in five weeks from 1915 to one in five days during 1918.
The fact is clearly established that the intensive campaign launched by the Germans in the spring of 1917, and which led to America entering the war, could not be kept up in the face of the continuous improvement in the Allied material and methods. It was not due to the development of anyone factor or appliance that the U-boat menace was overcome, but to the co-ordination of effort all around and the use made of experience in this novel form of sea fighting.
With regard to the relative effective uses of craft and appliances used, the conclusions which are now possible show that the destroyer was the most successful submarine hunter. Nearly one-third of the U-boats destroyed by the British navy in action were accounted for by destroyers. Toward the end of hostilities; however, the destroyer was being run very closely by the submarine. The improvements in the listening apparatus enabled them to detect the enemy craft accurately. Nearly a score of the latter was destroyed in the war by torpedoes from British submarines.
Naturally, as in all sea warfare, methods of disguise for the put pose of misleading and surprising the enemy played a large, part in anti-submarine operations, They were the mystery ships, or Q-boats, the first of which were merchant ships armed for attack but fitted to look like trading vessels, these being followed by other vessels specially built to resemble merchantmen, although they were actually warships.
The element of guile was also evident in the use of submarines towed by trawlers, with a telephonic connection between the two, the trawler noting as a decoy and the submarine delivering the sting at the proper moment in the shape of a torpedo. Unfortunately, this ruse, after two successes, was revealed to the enemy by leakage of information through German prisoners captured from the sunken boats and did not succeed further. In the same way, the achievements of the Q boats dwindled after the German’s suspicions were aroused. The moral Is that methods of this kind must be constantly changed, and also that greater precautions to maintain secrecy must be exercised.
So far as another craft used in the anti-submarine warfare is concerned, although some of these played a prominent part in the system of a convoy, none scored as many successes as the destroyers and submarines. Apart from the mines, the most effective of the appliances in use was the depth charge. The efficiency of the mine was shown not only in the restriction of the movements of submarines but by the large number the fate of which remains uncertain and most probably met their doom this way. The depth charge would have scored more heavily had the boats in which it was first employed been able to carry more than two of each of these devices.
Since the conviction appears to be widely held that the fleets of the future will be mainly composed of vessels with powers of submersion, it is just as well that some of the glamor and mystery connected with the underwater craft should be dispelled and that the opprobrium connected with their achievements should be fastened upon the German U-boats which alone deserve it.”
During the next year, the birth of the nuclear powered fast attack submarine will be covered on the blog. But this DNA analysis is important to laying the groundwork. The men who would eventually lay the case for deep diving fast boats with unlimited propulsive power were the early pioneers. This will be their legacy.
Mister Mac
Project 885 Graney-M / Project 885M Yasen - Kazan class
On 17 May 2019, TASS reported that the multi-purpose nuclear submarine "Kazan" of the project 885M (code Yasen-M) would not be handed over to the Russian Navy in 2019 because of the "need to refine the auxiliary systems that do not meet the requirements of the Ministry of Defense." Although this first unit of the re-started program had been launched on 31 March 2017, TASS reported: "It’s possible that it will take the whole year 2020 and Sevmash will be able to transfer Kazan to the fleet only in 2021”. The initial Project 885 boat, the Severodvinsk, had also required a four-year shakedown from launch to commissioning. American submarines of the Virginia class typically are commissioned within about a year after being launched.
The Project 885M / 08851 / Ash-M / Graney-M is an updated version of the Project 884 Severodvinsk, which was first laid down in 1992, and commissioned two decades later. Work on this boat was suspended in 1996, and the project was suspended for a decade until it was Included in the 2007 National Defense Procurement. This unit was launched in mid-2010, conducted sea trials in 2011, and entered service in 2014.
The original idea of the "universal silos" was a design with a multi-task profile, making it possible to change the profile of weapons loaded to adjust to several missions. Project 885 / 885M may be intended to eventually replace the 945 Barrakuda [NATO Sierra] attack submarine and 949A Antei [NATO Oscar II] "aircraft-carrier-killer" cruise missile submarine, so that only two classes of attack submarines will eventually remain in the navy. By the year 2020, the Russian fleet of cruise missile submarines will number 4 boats, down from 56 at the end of the Cold War, and nine as recently as 2010. Attack submarines will number 8 boats, down from 64 at the end of the Cold War, and 15 as recently as 2010.
The first of the improved 885M / 08851 / Ash-M / Graney-M was laid down in 2009 and expected to commission in 2019. Five more units were "laid down" at a rate of one per year from 2013 through 2017, but the pace of construction seems to be slowing by about one year every year, raising questions of whether the "laid down" milestone was, in fact, a "cut first metal" formality. By 2019 there were theoretically five boats under construction, and if this meant there were five hulls in various stages of completion, it would not be difficult to find photographic evidence, which is in fact lacking.
The delays may, in part, reflect difficulties in restarting production after nearly a quarter of a century of simply repairing the Soviet inheritance. It would have been irresponsible to build new boats with Cold War technology and designs, but even modest upgrades could pose production challenges. A submarine is far more than simply a hull - rather, it is stuffed with and coated with all manner of exotic devices. The industrial supply chain for many of these ingredients must have originally come from enterprises that dried up and blew away many years ago, located on sites that are now bustling condo complexes.
These submarines are built at Sevmash - Workshop #55, the same production facility that built 941 Akula / TYPHOON [made famous in The Hunt for Red October]. This facility is also currently building the 955 Borei ballistic missile submarine. It was reported on 04 December 2018 that by 2028, it was planned to build on Sevmash two more serial atomic strategic submarines of Project 955A Borey-A. It should be noted that this effectively represents a restart of the 955 production cadence, as there is an eight-year gap between unit #8 being laid down in 2016 and the new unit #9 being laid down in 2024. It seems probable that the priority afforded the SSBN project has contributed to the delay in the 885M attack submarine.
The construction of the Kazan, a second Project 885 Yasen (Graney) class nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine, started at the Sevmash shipyard in northern Russia on 24 July 2009. The Kazan submarine will feature more advanced equipment than the first vessel in the series - the Severodvinsk, which was laid down in 1992 and was scheduled to join the Russian navy in 2010 or early 2011 after a long delay for financial reasons. "The second submarine will have improved electronics and fire-control systems, and will be built exclusively with Russian-made materials and components," Sevmash spokeswoman Anastasia Nikitinskaya said. The submarine's armament will include 24 cruise missiles, including the 3M51 Alfa SLCM, the SS-NX-26 Oniks SLCM or the SS-N-21 Granat/Sampson SLCM. It will also have eight torpedo tubes as well as mines and anti-ship missiles such as SS-N-16 Stallion.
On 26 July 2009, Navy chief Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said the Russian Navy command had made a decision on building one nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine a year from 2011. Vysotsky said that construction of a second Project 885 Yasen (Graney) class nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine started at the Sevmash shipyard in northern Russia on July 24. Vysotsky said the state currently had all possibilities, including economic and financial, to implement this project as soon as possible.
Russia's Vedomosti daily said 15 June 2010 that the fourth-generation Russian nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine is too expensive for serial production, with the price of the strategic project kept secret, but the estimated cost reached $1 billion. Mikhail Barabanov, the editor-in-chief of Moscow Defense Brief magazine, said the submarine's cost was too high to make it viable for serial production. Barabanov told Vedomosti that the US Navy did not produce a large number of advanced Sea Wolf submarines, similar to the Project 885 Severodvinsk vessel since they were too expensive. Instead of these, they use cheaper and unsophisticated Virginia-class submarines.
The expert said the Russian Navy would probably replace the Severodvinsk nuclear submarine with a more affordable analog. Barabanov said the second Yasen (Graney) class submarine Project 885M Kazan was the most probable alternative to the Severodvinsk submarine. Russian experts expected Graney-class submarines to boost the Navy's operational effectiveness and combat capabilities.
The Russian Navy will receive a second Graney class nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine in 2015, a spokesman for the Malakhit design bureau said in February 2011. The construction of the Kazan submarine at the Sevmash Shipyard in the northern Russian city of Severodvinsk began in 2010. The first vessel of the Graney class, the Severodvinsk submarine, will enter service by the end of 2011. "The hull of the Kazan sub has been built, but we still have to make many upgrades compared with the first vessel in the series. We are planning to deliver the submarine to the Navy in 2015," the official told RIA Novosti.
As of March 2011, the construction of the third Graney class nuclear-powered attack submarine was to begin in 2011.
On 03 December 2011, the Sevmash shipyard said it would start building a series of five advanced Graney-M class attack submarines in 2012 under a recent contract between the Russian United Shipbuilding Corporation and the Defense Ministry. The Kazan will feature more advanced equipment and weaponry than the Severodvinsk and can be considered as a prototype of modernized Graney-M class submarines.
The active submarines of the Akula class are in restricted service to conserve their remaining reactor core lives. Assuming the nominal 30-year service life of their American counterparts, the oldest Akula I submarines might be withdrawn from service by around 2015, with all but the Gepard Akula II being withdrawn from service by 2025. The restricted service of these boats might easily extend their useful lives to 35 years, suggesting a phase-out in the 2020-2030 timeframe. The remaining four active Victor III submarines may be in restricted service, to conserve their remaining reactor core lives. Assuming the nominal 30-year service life of their American counterparts, at least the four youngest remaining Victor III submarines [if not even K-412] might remain in service until around 2020, but surely not much beyond that date.
Retaining the prevailing inventory of 21 active attack submarines would require completing a total of at least five and possibly as many as eight Graney-class submarines by around 2020, in addition to the pair slated for delivery before 2015. This could imply a construction rate of two boats a year for about four years in the 2020 timeframe, though the pace might slow after that.
Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky, the Navy chief, said 26 July 2009 that the Russian Navy command had decided on building one nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine a year from 2011. Vysotsky said the state currently had all possibilities, including economic and financial, to implement this project as soon as possible. Vysotsky also said that Russia would annually build warships and nuclear submarines for the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine's Crimea. "From 2010, we'll annually lay down one surface ship and one nuclear submarine for the Black Sea Fleet," he said.
The Russian Navy was planning to commission up to 10 Graney class nuclear-powered attack submarines by 2020, a high-ranking Navy official said. "We are expecting to receive about ten new Yasen [Graney] class attack submarines in the next ten years," the source told RIA Novosti 19 March 2011. The Russian Navy will receive at least eight Graney class nuclear-powered attack submarines in the next decade, Navy chief Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said on 29 July 2011. "We are expecting to receive at least eight attack submarines of this [Graney] class by 2020," Vysotsky said in an exclusive interview with RIA Novosti.
The Russian Navy will receive an improved Project 885M Yasen-class nuclear-powered attack submarine in 2016, Russia's Malakhit design bureau said 28 October 2014. "The first improved Project 885M submarine, the Kazan, will be delivered to the Russian Navy in 2016," Malakhit's Deputy General Director Nikolai Novoselov said.
The Kazan will feature more advanced equipment and weaponry than the Severodvinsk, which had been under construction since 1993. Russia planned to have at least eight Yasen class cruise-missile carrying attack boats in its submarine fleet.
Russia's latest Project 885M Yasen-class attack submarine will have an advanced sonar system allowing it to detect enemy ships at an early stage, the submarine's engineering bureau said on 26 July 2013. The Novosibirsk, the third of eight Yasen-class boats (designated Graney-class by NATO), is to be laid down at the Sevmash shipyard near the White Sea on Friday. The boat's designer, the Malakhit Marine Engineering Bureau company, said ahead of the ceremony that the new Yasen-M would have an advanced design that would significantly increase its ability to detect enemy vessels at speeds far higher speed than those of its predecessors.
Its bow section will be "acoustically clean" and will be entirely dedicated to housing sonar systems, with the torpedo systems relocated to another part of the boat, according to the company. In order to reduce noise and increase its stealth capability, new power supply and acoustic defense systems have been developed for the boat, Malakhit said. In addition to the torpedo tubes, the Yasen class will be armed with a multirole missile system, including a vertical-launcher for cruise missiles. Both the torpedo and missile tubes could be used "for a variety of weapons without being specially re-equipped," the company said.
A new-generation nuclear-powered submarine of the Yasen-M project was laid down at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk in northern Russia on 19 March 2015. The submarine dubbed the Arkhangelsk was the fifth Yasen-class multipurpose submarine, which the Sevmash shipyard is building.
As of 2015, it was planned that the Sevmash shipyard would build eight Yasen-class nuclear submarines fitted out with cruise missiles in accordance with Russia’s state armaments program until 2020.
The project to build a series of 7 Yasen class nuclear submarines will be completed after 2023, CEO of the St. Petersburg-based Malakhit Marine Engineering Design Bureau Vladimir Dorofeyev told TASS on 16 June 2015. According to previous reports, the state armaments program for the period until 2020 envisaged the construction of 8 Yasen class submarines. Also, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Viktor Chirkov said that after that the series would be continued. "In accordance with the state armaments program, the project to build a series of 7 submarines will be completed after 2023," Dorofeyev said.
The Kazan submarine was floated out by the shipbuilder Sevmash in northwestern Russia on 31 March 2017. It was due to enter service with the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet in 2018 after the completion of a series of state tests. The Russian Navy was currently equipped with one Yasen-class submarine, the Severodvinsk.
The head submarine of project 885M (code "Ash-M") "Kazan" will be delivered to the fleet no earlier than the end of 2020. This was announced on 17 October 2019 by the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) Alexei Rakhmanov. "Kazan told us about the problems that arise <...> Given several technically complex solutions related to the novelty of the systems, we seem to have to practice it all the next year," Rakhmanov said on the sidelines of a meeting of the Russian Engineering Union answering a TASS question. He specified that he would have to check several design solutions. The head of the USC said that the submarine has so far completed more than 12 trips to the sea as part of state tests. Kazan is the first multipurpose nuclear submarine of the improved project 885M (Yasen-M). It was laid at Sevmash in 2009, launched on March 31, 2017. It is planned that the boat will be part of the Northern Fleet, where the lead submarine of the Yasen-Severodvinsk series is already serving.
Message to the Mess: Earn Back the Sailors’ Trust
U.S.N. Chiefs must start leading from a position of compassion and concern with the intent to build trust with their sailors.
By Command Master Chief William Houlihan, U.S. Navy
What I’m about to say is directed to the Navy’s Chiefs’ Mess, and there are a few of you who will take it personally, and to you I say, good. Many more of you will question the medium and the audience and wonder why this discussion has to take place openly.
My answer to that is the way we conduct ourselves as chief petty officers affects our entire Navy.
Many of our sailors don’t trust the Mess. They don’t trust us because we are not doing the jobs we used to do, the jobs the Mess was intended to do.
Our focus seems to have shifted. Too many of us believe the strategic direction of our Navy is where we should be concentrating. Not enough of us are walking berthings, establishing standards, visiting the mess decks, and just listening to our men and women.
Chiefs need to get their damn heads out of their academic and post-Navy aspirations and back into the lives and development of their sailors. Our sailors don’t need chiefs pretending they understand the very complex concept of “strategy.” Our sailors need chiefs whose daily “strategy” revolves around unit mission and sailor development. Their playbooks are PODs and MRCs, profile sheets, and evals. Our best chiefs have their sleeves rolled up and their ears open. We’re moving away from that, and our sailors’ faith in us is dwindling.
Wardroom Aspirations
The Decatur Experiment didn’t last long.
In 2004, 19 Chief Petty Officers assigned to USS Decatur (DDG-73) were moved into division officer duties. Formally. Their traditional roles of leading sailors on the deck plates and training junior officers were altered to the point that they were tasked with being those division officers.
The Navy, to its credit, saw the risk and stopped it. Chiefs are chiefs. We are not division officers. We mentor division officers. We train division officers. We support our Div-Os and take pride in their success as we do our junior sailors.
We no longer are emphasizing those core responsibilities the way we used to. That’s not on the chiefs. That’s on the master chiefs and the senior chiefs leading chiefs. That’s on the selection boards who placed value on education and collateral duties instead of where that value should be placed: Sailor success. It’s on every one of us who train chief selectees during initiation.
Our sailors don’t trust our priorities. Through our own actions, they believe our personal interests lie in . . . our personal interests. They see chiefs who spend more time striving for qualifications traditionally held by officers than leading, caring, and teaching. It would appear that the reasons we scrapped the Decatur Experiment have been forgotten, and the reasoning behind its inception has regained validity.
The level of dialog between our Mess and our wardroom has never been higher. The conversations taking place in engineering log rooms, bridge wings, ready rooms, and hangar bays are incredible. Our Mess is becoming more credentialed, more educated, better versed in science, better writers, and more comfortable in joint environments.
The degrees are piling up, but at what expense?
We aren’t as visible, which makes us less relevant. We aren’t as accessible, which makes us less valuable. We aren’t in tune with our sailors, and that leads to a deterioration of trust.
“Exalted . . . and I use that word advisedly.”
It was Navy Times that made the problems public. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Steve Giordano, according to Navy Times and anonymous sources, had created a hostile work environment in his Pentagon office and developed an affection for privilege.
That story broke on 15 June.
Our 14th master chief petty officer of the Navy announced his retirement six days later.
I don’t know Giordano well, but I do know this: Chiefs have been creating, by design or in some cases through a character flaw, hostile work environments since 1893. Chiefs lead hard. Chiefs lead sternly. Chiefs establish standards and hold our sailors to them. And not all of us do it as well as others.
I know for a fact that it took me more than 20 years in the Mess to understand that I had created some toxic environments as I grew into my anchors. How some among us took to our ivory and khaki towers and wondered publicly how he could have created such an environment. Really, chief? How’s the culture in your work center? Are your sailors willing to bring you their problems, or do they fear you?
And privilege?
We, the Mess, haven’t exactly avoided privilege over the years. From parking spaces to CPO birthday celebrations that inexplicably last a week, from our own geographic location on ships to eat and live: privilege. Earned and, in most cases, necessary? Yes. But privilege just the same.
How about six weeks every year, a lot of it spent outside the work center? Does that sound like privilege? Yes. Our initiation is the greatest “perk” we have and it’s one we wouldn’t have if our commanding officers didn’t allow for it and see the value in it.
Our sailors see it, and when they see us abuse it or grow too tied to it? They begin to wonder. Our sailors wonder if we are more tied to the perks of being a chief or to the greatest privilege of all, and that’s the honor of leading sailors.
Our Sailors Are Harming Themselves
Our sailors don’t trust the Mess.
You won’t see that on too many t-shirts, but there are two clear signs across the fleet pointing to it as fact—specifically suicides and suicidal ideations. Those numbers are on the rise and lead to this: if Sailors are so troubled that suicide is even a fleeting thought, what led them to that place, and who in their chain of command could or should have seen the signs and spoken to them well before those thoughts took form?
Nine Sailors committed suicide in January. The number of ideations I see in a daily destructive behavior report is staggering. If we’re going to discuss trust, and I mean really discuss it, this better be where we anchor. Every time I see a report of ideation or worse, my first thought is, “Where was their Chief?” I am not naïve or jaded enough to believe every one of those situations could or should have been fixed by the Mess. But I am realistic enough to believe that many of our junior sailors with severe problems are not bringing their issues to the men and women who could help them the most.
Our sailors don’t trust us enough to bring us their problems before those problems lead to harmful or reckless thoughts and actions. If you find this hard to believe, ask your divisions. Better yet, ask your second class petty officers. They’re traditionally the real influencers. Ask them if the junior sailors feel comfortable bringing their problems to the chief.
Regaining The Trust And Why
Before we determine how to get that trust back or establish it initially, we need to ask why.
The “why” is important here because, and deny this if you want, there are some among us who feel that if a sailor isn’t “happy” or “satisfied,” then the Navy simply isn’t for him or her. They haven’t “bought-in” and we lead them differently, or we ignore them and focus on those who fit our personal labels of what a “good sailor” is.
We need them all — every single one. Every sailor is our sailor. We need them because our nation’s enemies, real or potential, relish the thought of a fractured force.
Gaining trust isn’t just about preventing suicide. It’s about the mission. Sailors who trust us will follow us. They will question less and act quicker. They will perform because they trust that you have their personal well being and professional success in mind.
Our sailors, if led well, do not feel like they’ve been hired, or gained, or accessed . . . they feel like they’ve been adopted.
It’s how we used to be led. Talk to a retired chief and ask them about their perception of today’s Mess compared to the one that raised them and you’ll get an earful. More likely, an eyeful if it’s on one of the seemingly hundreds of CPO Facebook pages. A lot of it is bluster or disconnection, but some of it rings true. Our Chiefs took a personal interest, an immediate and possessive interest in us as sailors and as people.
We earn a sailor’s trust by doing what they’ve been led to believe chiefs do: lead, nurture, discipline, care, challenge. “Taking care of sailors” is a tired cliché and one, in my opinion, that we should eliminate. Chiefs should be challenging our sailors while we create the conditions for their success and the conditions in which their families can safely thrive.
Plenty of chiefs were taken aback when the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Russ Smith recently emphasized their expectations of the Mess.
In a virtual all-hands call broadcast on Facebook Live on 26 February, the CNO said, “In my vision if any of our sailors have a problem, they should be able to go to their leader, their LPO, their chief, their division officer, whoever that person is and have 100 percent confidence that leader will take this on, advocate for the sailor and solve that problem.”
To paraphrase: Do your job. Train your Div-Os and your LPOs. Fix your sailors’ problems when those problems become too much for the sailor to handle themselves.
Smith said, “Getting after, finding out why our sailors are distracted—whether it’s personal issues, pay and entitlements issues, housing issues, whatever the case is—this is what chiefs exist to do. Get in there. Solve problems. Remove distractions. And provide our sailors the opportunity to practice their craft.”
It’s how we build trust. It’s why we must build trust. Sailors have issues. Families have challenges. We did. Our chiefs helped us overcome them. We can’t fix them if we don’t know and we won’t know if there isn’t…
Trust. It’s used once in the “Chief’s Creed,” a document I read and believe in more than any other. “Trust is inherent with the donning of the uniform of a Chief.” Got it. I believe it. I need to trust my fellow chiefs, and I need them to trust me. But where is the line that guides us to lead in such a way that compels our sailors to trust us implicitly? Where does the Creed tell me to take custody of my sailors and lead them with compassion and character?
Where does the Creed tell me that being a “Good Chief” equals, in many respects, being a good person?
“Get Back to Chiefing.”
In writing this article, I spoke to a fellow CMC told me of a meeting he attended and his almost off-hand comment to a captain, a remark that indicated he was in the process of reminding his Mess what our true responsibilities are. He was in the process of emphasizing the reestablishment of trust among our junior sailors, through character across the Mess.
“Good,” said the captain. “Scrape the pirate stickers off the backs of your trucks and get back to chiefing.”
Get back to chiefing.
We should all pause a second and consider that. Permission, if you need it, to be a chief petty officer. Permission granted to lead. Lead. Lead as we know-how. Lead like we’ve been taught. Keep that swagger specific only to a Navy chief petty officer but, at the same time, learn our sailors and gain their trust through integrity. Be tough, but invest ourselves and invest our self-worth in the development of our sailors as people and as warfighters.
There is a tried and true CPO initiation training tool that I won’t go into too deeply here. It revolves around teaching a CPO select how to lead a division. They’re given one dozen theoretical sailors, and each of those sailors comes with challenges and the problems we see sailors face every day. For decades we, the Mess, have focused on programs, on knowledge of the process, as we guide the selectees toward finding solutions.
We should be training our new chiefs the value of establishing trust through listening, through making small promises and following through on every one of them. Promise a sailor you will visit the housing office, then do it. Promise a sailor Thursday afternoon off to attend a well-baby appointment, then make it happen. Small promises. Small investments that build trust.
Get out from behind your desk. Look a sailor in the eye, and don’t be distracted by your computer. Take them to the fantail, to an office and genuinely ask them how they are. Look them in the eye and hold it until they realize you’re serious. You genuinely want to know.
Become chiefs like ETCS Brandon House and EMCS Leon Howell. I had the privilege of serving with them onboard the USS Milius (DDG-69). To their sailors, they were the embodiment of what a chief should be. There were no secrets in their divisions. If sailors had a problem, the LPO knew and fixed it. If she couldn’t fix it, she took it to Howell or House. You better believe neither slept until they found a solution. If you were a chief in our Mess on the Milius and House or Howell caught wind of lazy leadership? Stand by. They addressed it. Quickly. In the Mess, in front of our fellow chiefs. Peer pressure was and is a tremendous device.
Their divisions simply didn’t fail. Ever. Those sailors refused to fail out of fear of disappointing the chiefs who led them, and the chiefs those sailors had learned to trust.
This is not hard. It’s not eccentric thinking. Most of it is straight out of our Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles. “Chiefs are visible leaders who set the tone . . . we will know our sailors and develop them beyond their own expectations.”
This is not a Jerry Maguire manifesto that will ruin careers if you take it on. This is simply leading from a position of compassion and concern with the intent to build trust. It took me years to see the value of it and, frankly, it’s probably and unfortunately too late for me to leverage what I’ve discovered. But, if you’re a chief leading a division, reading this in the evening, you can put it into play tomorrow at quarters. It isn’t too late to shift your culture. It’s not too late to start building trust.
We must do this. We must create a culture of trust. We don’t “gain” sailors. We adopt them. We take custody of them. Their success is our success.
Start today. If you need to change your way of leading, do it. If you don’t know how to call me. Our Mess must be better because our sailors deserve it.
Indian Navy Plans to Build Six Nuke-Powered Submarines
16:27 29.12.2019
New Delhi (Sputnik): The Indian Navy is upgrading the security infrastructure of its naval airfields. As part of the plan, systems will be installed to provide continuous surveillance, real-time alerting and immediate response to a threat. The Navy also plans to purchase naval guns from the US for warships.
To expand its underwater fleet, the Indian Navy is planning to build six nuclear submarines, while also deliberating a fleet of 18 conventional submarines.
The Navy has shared the information regarding fleet expansion plans with a parliamentary committee on defense.
"Six SSN (nuclear-powered attack) submarines and eighteen conventional are planned. The existing strength comprises fifteen conventional and one nuclear submarine, which is available on lease", said the Standing Committee on Defence in its report tabled in Parliament earlier this month.
Some of the report's contents, however, were reported by some Indian media organizations on Sunday. It reveals India will build the nuclear submarines at home in partnership with the private sector.
The standing committee in its report also mentioned that the Indian Navy informed it during the deliberations that the existing 13 conventional submarines are between 17 to 31 years old.
The Indian Navy is also working on Project 75, which envisages building an additional six conventional submarines in coordination with Indian companies. It will also receive contributions from foreign equipment manufacturers. The building up of the submarines under Project 75 will be a part of a strategic partnership policy.
The Navy also informed the parliamentary standing committee that only two new conventional submarines had been inducted into the fleet in the last 15 years.
Thanks, Bud
John Bud Cunnally ETC (SS) Ret. USN – President
International Submariners Association of the U.S.A. (ISA/USA)
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