В НОЯБРЕ ВЗНОСЫ ОПЛАТИЛИISA/USA Application attached-Happy Thanksgiving-Unmanned Sub's will dominate-Nuclear Back to Diesel?-Babcock providing Weeps Handling to Australia-Russia's drone Has Seabed-Launched Version-Navy study extend Missiles to the 2080's-Sub Force New Commander
Date: 17 Dec 2019
ISA/USA Website: www.ISAUSA.Org
Our newest vest pin that is twice as large as the original and can be read by us old coggers without our glasses.
Actual Size 1 1/2” by 7/10” For just $6.50 each shipping included.
Join 28 other Nation’s Submariners and for fun and travel.
Consider becoming a member of the ISA-USA; you will benefit in many ways.
- Be part of a 50-year tradition of international friendships of submarine sailors. Check out www.submariners.org for the history of the International Association
- Travel to foreign countries to participate in conventions that usually include twenty-five countries in attendance.
- Establish friendships with submariners in foreign nations.
- Contribute your Submarine history and experience in our World Wide e-mail blast.
- We Cheerfully accept members that have not served but are interested in worldwide submarine activities
Lifetime membership only $50.00.
ISA/USA Membership Application. All new members of ISA/USA receive a Membership card, ISA/USA Patch, and new Vest larger Pin. Click on the attached file above.
Or from our weblink below:
Send to:
John Bud Cunnally ETC (SS) Ret. USN – President
International Submariners Association of the U.S.A. (ISA/USA)
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We say “Fair Winds and Following Seas” to our warmly remembered member TMC (SS) Raymond W. Stone who has reported to the Eternal Patrol.
Chief Petty Officer TMC (SS) Raymond W. Stone, USNR, (Ret.) entered the calm waters of the everlasting during the early morning hours of November 19, 2019.
He was the son of Frances M. Stone and Captain Raymond M. Stone, NOAA, born on Dec. 12, 1943, in Seattle, WA.
He enlisted in the Naval Reserve in May of 1963, attended submarine school in Groton, CT and then TM 'A' school in Key West, FL. After qualifying in submarines onboard USS Carp (SS-338), he continued his active duty serving for two years onboard USS Runner (SS-476). He also served on the USS Sea Cat, USS Grampus, USS Drum, USS Torsk, USS Trumpetfish, USS Picuda, USS Sirago, USS Haddock and USS Trieste II. In support of Subgroup 5, he served with AS37 Dixon.
In September 1985, Chief Stone was voluntarily recalled to active duty to serve as a technical consultant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Systems (COMNAVRESFOR Code 10) at Naval Reserve Headquarters in New Orleans, LA. He was involved with the design and development of local and wide area networks used by the Naval Reserve Force.
He also served as Defense Data Network (DDN) Host Administrator and LAN Manager for staff headquarters. He established a network of electronic bulletin board systems (BBSs) throughout the NR Readiness Commands, provided extensive training for the REDCOM system operators, and was the architect of the BBS hub installed at CNRF headquarters.
During his tour, he served on the Force Master Chief Board of Advisors and attended the NERA National Conferences (1987, 1988, 1989) as a keynote speaker and as an expert in Naval Reserve ADP issues.
He earned the following commendations: Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Star), Good Conduct Award, Navy Achievement Medal, Expert Pistol Medal, Marksman Rifle Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Naval Reserve Meritorious Service Medal (4 Stars), Navy Commendation Medal and qualified SS Designator.
In October 1990, Chief Stone returned to the Washington DC area to continue his civilian career in information systems management. He retired as a TMC(SS) from the Naval Reserve service in September 1991.
Chief Stone earned a B.S. in Management from Northwood University and holds an M.S. degree in Management from Troy State University. He served as Commander for the American Legion Post 176 and as Base Commander for the United States Submarine Veterans, Inc. at the Northern Virginia Base.
Chief Stone had an intimate love for music and was an accomplished drummer. On one occasion, he accompanied his mother playing at a Washington Symphony Orchestra concert as a stand-in drummer.
He is survived by his daughter Jeanene L. Stone of Stevensville, MD and brother Edward M. Stone of Woodland Park, CO.
Interment will be held at Arlington National Cemetery --date and time to be announced.
The Netherlands: 3 bidders shortlisted for the submarine replacement program
Walrus class submarine. Photo: Dutch MOD
The Dutch Ministry of Defence (MOD) has selected Naval Group, Saab Kockums, and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems for the next bidding phase in the Royal Netherlands Navy’s submarine replacement program.
On December 13, 2019, the Netherlands MOD announced that the three consortia are invited to enter the next stage of the EUR 2.5 billion (USD 2.8 billion) program.
The fourth consortium, led by Spanish shipbuilder Navantia, is now out of the competition.
The ministry has also issued a B-letter for the Walrus-class submarine replacement program that will see the construction of four new submarines for the navy.
As informed, the contract would be signed with one of the companies in 2022. All four submarine newbuilds are planned to be operational by 2031.
The Royal Netherlands Navy has four older Walrus class submarines which have been in service since 1990 – Walrus, Zeeleeuw, Dolfijn, and Bruinvis. This is the only submarine class in the navy’s fleet.
Naval Today Staff
APRA HARBOR, Guam (Dec. 10, 2019)
191210-N-VR594-1020
APRA HARBOR, Guam (Dec. 10, 2019) The Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Key West (SSN 722) steams toward the harbor in preparation for a mobile logistics demonstration with the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Richard E. Byrd. The demonstration is designed to evaluate the supply ship's ability to sustain submarine operations in an expeditionary setting. Key West is one of four forward-deployed submarines assigned to Commander, Submarine Squadron Fifteen out of Polaris Point, Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kelsey J. Hockenberger/Released)
1. Royal Navy Submarine Class Comparison
In this initial section, I compare the British submarines involved in WW2 with the Amphion Class, particularly drawing the reader's attention to the similarity of weapons and operating equipment. Elsewhere on this site, the reader will find a list of the T Class and a list of the S Class. The small U Class and V Class did not serve in the Far East submarine campaign, but later two V Class were there, used as exercise targets.
It is notable that using the modern term "weapon platform" to describe the Royal Navy submarines built in WW2 - the S Class, T Class, U Class and Amphion Class, that they were all fitted with same main weapon - the Mk VIII torpedo, a reliable, largely 'Point and Aim' missile. - The number of re-loadable forward tubes was 6, except in the Amphion Class, where the number was restricted to 4 to achieve the cylindrical hull required to reach depths of 700ft, where the previous design the T Class riveted was 300 ft. The T Class welded was 350 ft. The Amphion Class however, had the advantage of two reloadable tubes in the stern as had been the case in the so-called 'China Boats' of 1928/1930, the Long Range Patrol submarines such as the Oberon Class. Also, external non-reloadable tubes were fitted on Amphion Class, T Class and S Class at various times, the Amphion Class had two forward/2 astern, while the T Class had three pointing astern and two forward. Some S Class were fitted with one reloadable stern tube The number of reloadable torpedoes stored varied with 6 in the T Class and S Class, with the Amphion Class 10 having inboard storage fore and aft. Generally speaking, the main attacking forward torpedoes were similar in number. However, there is no doubt stern tubes were of great advantage in attacking a group of escorted merchant ships, hence the fitting of the aft pointing external tubes in WW2. But in the Far East, where the RN patrolled, larger merchant ship and warship targets in large groups were rather sparse compared to the Mediterranean campaign with convoys such as those supplying Rommel's desert army.
The rest of the equipment, such as TCS (Fruit Machine), the 129/138 ASDIC sets, and the Radar sets were the same and more or less remained so until the mid-fifties when the various conversion programs of the fifties commenced. In this regard, I want to point out several S Class were modernized in the mid-fifties with the gun tower removed etc and gave good service into the next decade, HMS Sidon sadly sinking due to an explosion while loading an HTP torpedo for trials. (note- I am not referring to the HMS Seraph and her sisters that were drastically streamlined, Seraph first in 1944 to give escorts the experience of a fast submarine.) This proved to be the way of the future after the war leaving the Amphion Class rather out of date.
And as we all know, the SSN Conqueror used Mk VIII torpedoes rather than the more modern torpedoes she also carried, to sink the Argentine cruiser Belgrano in the Falklands war 1982.
As all the WW2 accounts relate, the single forward deck-mounted gun played a major role, particular in sinking coastal shipping supplying the Axis armies, even destroying trains. The Amphion Class had a forward shielded 4 inch while T Class though fitted with a similar 4-inch gun had a less enclosing shield. The S Class, had in earlier built boats, 3-inch un-shielded deck guns, while later builds had 4 inch with a similar gun platform to the T Class. All three submarines had a gun tower with a hatch at the top and one at the hull level giving quick and relatively easy access to the magazine below. Later in the war, the T Class and S Class were fitted with a 'Bandstand' AA gun platform on the after part of the conning tower, to mount a 20mm Oerlikon cannon. From various accounts, this weapon proved quite useful in despatching small enemy vessels. In the immediate post-war period, all the 'Bandstands' were removed. The first Amphion Class was commissioned with the 'Bandstand' and gun still fitted. Though not relevant to the main topic, I have recently come across photographs of the early Amphion Class still fitted with the Bandstand and the hinged snort mast, until then I had assumed the 'Bandstands' were removed before the snort masts and the associated pipes were fitted - obviously one can make sensible assumptions about naval history that turn out to be incorrect.
The key virtues of the Amphion Class compared to the T Class and S Class modified for the Far East, were twice the operating depth and greater surface speed, with reloadable stern tubes. Regarding surface speed, in my experience, the superchargers were rarely used in Amphion Class as they took too much fuel. It is a well, in discussing the relative ranges of the RN submarines in the Far East, to recall the Cube Law, that to double the speed of a ship, requires eight times the power (fuel). And though not my field, I always understood that in my period, the fuel bill was always a consideration - particularly in the early years after the war when the nation was in serious financial difficulties.
An issue I have seen never mentioned in submarine literature is the significant increase in the surface silhouette of the Amphion Class - after the First of Class Trials, it was found necessary to raise the height of the periscope standards to stop periscope vibration and add the bow buoyancy tank for improved stability in heavy seas. The difference in the height of the standards can be seen when comparing the rare, early unaltered images of Amphion and Astute, with the many later Amphion Class photographs - the increase is over 3 feet. The bow buoyancy tank was removed during the streamlined program of the late-fifties (presumably, the removal of the external torpedo tubes made this possible). However, the very tall fin suggests the high periscope standards remained.
Amphion fin
NOTE. The USN found greater operating depth desirable in their campaign against the Japanese and reviewed existing designs and, as a consequence, did go deeper when under attack. However, notably no T Class were lost in the Far East, and in the circumstances of the S Class boat losses, increased maximum depth would have been of no value.
Report to Congress on the Virginia-Class Attack Submarine Program
December 11, 2019, 7:07 AM
The following is the Dec. 5, 2018, Congressional Research Service report, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress.
From the report
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) since FY1998. The three Virginia-class boats that the Navy has requested for procurement in FY2020 (which are to have the hull numbers SSN-804, SSN-805, and SSN-812) would be the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd boats in the class. Virginia-class boats scheduled for procurement in FY2019-FY2023 are to be procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract.
Before the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission, Navy plans had called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. SSN-812 was added to the FY2020 budget request as part of the FY2020 budget planning cycle. The Navy states that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, it would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of a boat procured in FY2023.
Most Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years are to be built with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission shows that Virginia-class boats with and without the VPM have estimated recurring unit procurement costs of roughly $3.2 billion and $2.8 billion, respectively.
The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission estimates the combined procurement cost of the three Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2020 at $9.274.4 (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The boats have received $1,756.9 million in prior-year “regular” advance procurement (AP) funding and $361.6 million in additional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $7,155.9 million in procurement funding needed to complete the boats’ combined procurement cost as estimated in the FY2020 budget submission, as well as $1,887.6 million in “regular” AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years and $882.0 million in additional EOQ AP funding for components of boats to be procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the total amount of procurement and AP funding requested for the program in FY2020 to $9,925.5 million (i.e., about $9.9 billion), excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
The Navy’s force-level goal for SSNs is to achieve and maintain a force of 66 boats. The Navy’s SSN force included 51 boats at the end of FY2018. From the mid-2020s through the early 2030s, the number of SSNs is projected to experience a valley or trough, reaching a minimum of 42 boats in FY2027-FY2028. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every year since then. The Navy’s FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that, after reaching its projected 42-boat minimum, the SSN force will increase to 66 boats by FY2048.
Issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include the impact on the program of the Department of Defense being funded for at least part of FY2020 by a continuing resolution (CR); a reduction in the number of boats to be covered in the FY2019-FY20-23 MYP contract; a shortfall of more than $1 billion in program procurement funding reported in November 2019; whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do in the program in FY2020; the funding profile for SSN-812; the potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time; and technical risk in the design for the latest (i.e., Block V) version of the Virginia-class submarine.
All,
Just in case you forgot From Member Trin Rios:
Meaning of Flag Draped Coffin
All Americans should be given this lesson. Those who think that America is an arrogant nation should reconsider that thought. Our founding fathers used GOD's word and teachings to establish our Great Nation, and I think it's high time Americans get re-educated about this Nation's history.
Pass it along and be proud of the country we live in and even more proud of those who serve to protect our 'GOD GIVEN' rights and freedoms.
I hope you take the time to read this ... To understand what the flag-draped coffin means ... Here is how to understand the flag that laid upon it and is surrendered to so many widows and widowers.
Do you know that at military funerals, the 21-gun salute stands for the sum of the numbers in the year 1776?
Have you ever noticed the honor guard pays meticulous attention to correctly folding the United States of America Flag 13 times? You probably thought it was to symbolize the original 13 colonies, but we learn something new every day!
The 1st fold of the flag is a symbol of life.
The 2nd fold is a symbol of the belief in eternal life.
The 3rd fold is made in honor and remembrance of the veterans departing the ranks who gave a portion of their lives for the defense of the country to attain peace throughout the world.
The 4th fold represents the weaker nature, for as American citizens trusting in God, it is to Him, we turn in times of peace as well as in the time of war for His divine guidance.
The 5th fold is a tribute to the country, for in the words of Stephen Decatur, 'Our Country, in dealing with other countries, may she always be right; but it is still our country, right or wrong.'
The 6th fold is for where people's hearts lie. It is with their heart that they pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States Of America, and the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.
The 7th fold is a tribute to its Armed Forces, for it is through the Armed Forces that they protect their country and their flag against all her enemies, whether they are found within or without the boundaries of their republic.
The 8th fold is a tribute to the one who entered into the valley of the shadow of death, that we might see the light of day.
The 9th fold is a tribute to womanhood and Mothers. For it has been through their faith, their love, loyalty and devotion that the character of the men and women who have made this country great has been molded.
The 10th fold is a tribute to the father, for he, too, has given his sons and daughters for the defense of their country since they were firstborn.
The 11th fold represents the lower portion of the seal of King David and King Solomon and glorifies in the Hebrews eyes, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.
The 12th fold represents an emblem of eternity and glorifies, in the Christians eyes, God the Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit.
The 13th fold, or when the flag is completely folded, the stars are uppermost reminding them of their Nations's motto, 'In God We Trust.'
After the flag is completely folded and tucked in, it takes on the appearance of a cocked hat, ever reminding us of the soldiers who served under General George Washington, and the Sailors and Marines who served under Captain John Paul Jones, who were followed by their comrades and shipmates in the Armed Forces of the United States, preserving for them the rights, privileges and freedoms they enjoy today.
There are some traditions and ways of doing things that have deep meaning.
In the future, you'll see flags folded and now you will know why.
Share this with the children you love and all others who love what is referred to, the symbol of ' Liberty and Freedom.'
MAYBE THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD READ THIS EXPLANATION BEFORE THEY RENDER THEIR DECISION ON THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE. FORWARD IT; MAYBE SOMEONE WITH THE NECESSARY POWER, OR POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL INFLUENCE, WILL GET IT TO THEM.
IN THE MEANTIME, MAY GOD PROTECT US ALWAYS.
After Early Stumbles, Navy, Newport News Might Be Turning the Corner on Private Yard Sub Repairs
By: Megan Eckstein
December 9, 2019 3:23 PM • Updated: December 9, 2019 4:43 PM
Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Boise (SSN-764) enters Souda Bay, Greece, in 2014. US Navy Photo
WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Navy and submarine builder Newport News Shipbuilding are committed to having a private industry submarine repair capacity for the long-haul, even if the first recent forays into the effort resulted in long delays and cost overruns.
The Navy’s own ability to maintain its attack submarines has been strained in recent years, as the four public naval shipyards are overwhelmed with work on the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines and the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, with Los Angeles- and Virginia-class attack subs being the lowest priority work. These SSNs have often seen delayed inductions or delays once in the shipyard due to the workforce being tied up with higher-priority availabilities. As a result, the Navy a couple of years ago tried to send some of this work out to industry – both Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding yard in Virginia and the General Dynamics Electric Boat yard in Connecticut – but ultimately those two yards saw their delays and cost-overruns with USS Helena (SSN-725) and USS Montpelier (SSN-765), respectively.
Navy leaders at a Senate hearing last week couched the problem as one of basic workforce skill and program management that arose as the private yards tried to reconstitute an in-house repair capability. But a Newport News official told USNI News that many of the challenges arose when the yard tried to take on repair work without the same benefits of lessons learned and advanced planning that the public yards have access to. Both sides, however, are committed to doing better and hope to continue performing submarine maintenance at Newport News for years to come.
Vice Adm. Tom Moore, commander of Naval Sea Systems Command, told USNI News last week after a Senate Armed Services Committee that delays with Helena had led to delays in the ongoing USS Columbus (SSN-762) availability at Newport News now and the expected upcoming availability of USS Boise (SSN-764) there in 2020.
“I think what we’re trying to do at Newport News is to help them… establish a workforce, to regain some proficiency, get better at the planning. We’ve offered up resources from the public shipyards to go down and help them, from a lead maintenance activity perspective and project management perspective,” Moore said when asked about the status of and the cause of the delays, which Moore first acknowledged one and a half years ago.
“There’s some basic fundamental blocking and tackling that they’ve got to get better at, and I think they recognize that. We want to keep them in the submarine maintenance business for the long-haul for several reasons: it’s a surge volume for the public shipyards, and it’s also if we go to war we’d like to have that capacity.”
USS Jefferson City (SSN-759) departs Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard after completing an engineering overhaul to prolong the life of the submarine. US Navy Photo
Moore added that Newport News is “getting better. We’re close to delivering Helena, expect to get that out here probably in the February timeframe. Columbus will be undocking probably sometime in the late spring or early summer, and then we’ll get Boise in there as well. So they’re making improvements. We’d certainly like to see the pace of that increase, and we’re working pretty closely with them because we need them to be successful.”
A Newport News Shipbuilding official, who spoke to USNI News on condition of not being named, said the company has extensive experience with submarines – through pairing with Electric Boat to build all the Navy’s subs – and with repair work – conducting aircraft carrier mid-life overhauls at the shipyard and sending personnel to repair yards and bases around the world to work on carriers and subs. Doing submarine repair work at the shipyard, though, is something that hasn’t been done since about 2009.
“We did reconstitute a workforce and facilities here in the yard to pick up some of the submarine maintenance where the naval shipyards found themselves with a heavy workload,” the official said.
“We did stand that team up pretty rapidly and picked up Helena. After Helena, which we’re looking to complete early next year, we have the Columbus in the yard, and that’s an [engineered overhaul]. So we have been fortunate to have great support from the Navy on their experiences in submarine fleet support and maintenance. We’ve had good communications and had solid teamwork on opportunities to learn from one another and continuously improve. They’ve shared a lot with us and we’ve shared a lot in return to try to provide the best outcome possible for all of us, for the Navy, for the nation, to get these boats back out in the fleet where we all want them.”
The Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Helena (SSN 725) arrives at Norfolk Naval Shipyard for a high-priority docking continuous maintenance availability on Aug. 20, 2015. Helena will spend less than four months in the shipyard while workers complete the oil tank inspection and install technology upgrades. US Navy photo.
Much of that sharing, though, didn’t start until after Helena was in the yard and overran its docking selected restricted availability that was set to last five-and-a-half to six months. The sub arrived at Newport News in October 2017 and should have been done by about April 2018. Instead, Helena is still being worked on today and is expected to come out of the yard around February 2020, nearly two years late.
The Newport News Shipbuilding official said the company has deep experience in hiring and training the right personnel, investing in the right facilities and tools and managing programs to be successful; similarly, the government/industry team has long ago learned the lessons that were contracting and planning have to be done early, and materials have to be on hand at the beginning of the work period to be successful.
And yet, Newport News did not have access to the right information for early planning or materials acquisition ahead of starting Helena in the same way that the four public yards would have, setting up a difficult first-in-a-decade private sub repair.
For example, the public yards have a “contingent material list” of items that should be kept on hand in case they are needed. This covers items, not in the official work scope but that have arisen in past maintenance availabilities often enough that it’s common knowledge within the Navy that the materials should be on hand to avoid delays if emergent work arises. The NNS official said the company did not have that list before Helena was inducted into its docking availability, leading to some delays as the company had to pause while the material was ordered and eventually delivered.
Similarly, Columbus began work in July 2017 and was supposed to be completed in August 2019. Instead, Moore predicted that the sub would be undocked and returned to the fleet in April 2020.
Private repair yards on the surface ship maintenance side have experienced similar issues, complaining that the Navy has access to more information on ship conditions and work scope than the yards do. That information can’t always be shared due to rules related to competitively contracting out the maintenance work. Still, the Navy and the private yards have worked diligently recently to find ways to award contracts earlier, conduct more thorough planning earlier, assemble better materials lists, and other steps to ensure better outcomes: chiefly, on-time, and on-budget deliveries back to the fleet. Those lessons could likely be applied to private companies bidding for submarine repair work to see similar improvements in performance.
The Newport News Shipbuilding official said the shipyard learned a lot about expected and emergent work, as well as expected and emergent testing that will be required for future work on Los Angeles-class SSNs. These lessons learned the hard way, plus information shared by the Navy in recent months should set the yard up for greater success in upcoming availabilities, including the Boise engineered overhaul that will start as soon as Columbus finishes this spring.
“The lessons from Helena, where they apply, and certainly from Columbus as an EOH, are very significantly deployed into the Boise plans,” the official said, adding that the company and NAVSEA have been in talks in recent weeks about Boise, even though the submarine won’t transit to the yard for several more months, to look for opportunities to team company and Navy personnel and share lessons learned to ensure significant improvement in the next EOH.
Despite the challenges with these first LA-class availabilities, HII spokeswoman Beci Brenton said the company and the shipyard are committed to continuing this work with the Navy and achieving better outcomes.
Shipyard workers at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard successfully undock the Los Angeles-class submarine USS San Juan (SSN 751) one day early from a routine engineered overhaul in August 2011. US Navy photo.
“Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) remains committed to a strong and supportive partnership with the U.S. Navy. We have a long history of executing U.S. Navy shipbuilding and maintenance work, and we continue to grow, develop and train the workforce necessary to support the increasing pace and volume of both shipbuilding and maintenance needs of the U.S. Navy. Our efforts to support the Navy maintenance community includes continued execution and support of ship maintenance on-site around the world at naval shipyards and naval bases, and the more recent reconstitution of the resources and capabilities to perform submarine maintenance work at our shipyard. We now have nearly 1,200 Newport News shipbuilders executing submarine fleet support work at NNS as we near completion on our first submarine maintenance availability, USS Helena, in over a decade,” Brenton told USNI News.
“We value our close working relationship with the U.S. Navy and we are excited by the teamwork and partnership that occurs every day across the government/industry teams that contribute mutual value and benefit for our nation’s industrial capabilities and national defense.”
If Newport News can bounce back from these two challenging maintenance availabilities, it appears the workload will become more manageable. The official said Newport News Shipbuilding has determined its best workload would be one availability right after the next, heel to toe, rather than having two boats in at once as was inadvertently the case with Helena and Columbus. Additionally, the official said, as the Los Angeles-class submarines near the end of their service life, after a few more LA-class jobs, the workload would likely switch over to the newer Virginia-class submarines.
“That would be something we would expect to execute very, very well because we know the boats; they’re earlier in their life, so their material condition is a little bit more completely known; the supply base is out therefore new construction and available; we are executing the [post-shakedown availabilities]. So I think it’s likely that we’ll see Newport News transition into most, if not all, Virginia-class boats after a couple more 688s,” the official said.
Having already invested in capital improvements and the standup and training of a 1,200-person team to do submarine repair work, the official said, “we’re in this business for the long haul. In an area that we know the Navy needs support from us on, and it’s work that we want to provide support to for years into the future.”
Cold War-legacy Russian rocket-powered supercavitating torpedo development could yield deadly new results
One of the most innovative underwater weapons developed by the Soviet Union was the VA-111 Shkval (Squall) supercavitating torpedo.
Dec 6th, 2019
MOSCOW – While a lull in great power competition delayed the impact of this new technology, the so-called supercavitating torpedo may be about to take the world by storm. The National Interest reports. Continue reading the original article
The Military & Aerospace Electronics take:
6 Dec. 2019 -- One of the most innovative underwater weapons developed by the Soviet Union was the VA-111 Shkval (Squall) supercavitating torpedo.
Highly classified, Shkval was virtually unknown before the end of the Cold War and only became common knowledge in the mid-1990s. The rocket-powered torpedo was capable of astonishing speeds of up to 200 knots an hour. But in a world where physics ensured most ships and underwater weapons topped out at 50 knots, how did Russian engineers accomplish such a breakthrough in speed?
Traditionally, torpedoes use propellers or pumpjets for propulsion. Shkval, on the other hand, uses a rocket engine. That alone is enough to make it fast, but traveling through water creates major drag problems. The solution: get the water out of the path of the torpedo. But how, exactly, does one get water off the path of an object in the middle of an ocean?
Related: Northrop Grumman team eyes developing technology for a 100-mile-per-hour submarine
The Virginia Class Submarines Are 3 Classes In 1
Craig Hooper Contributor
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The Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) Delaware will officially enter the fleet next year
Last week, the U.S. Navy and America’s big submarine manufacturers celebrated the signing of a long-delayed contract for the fifth tranche of Virginia class submarines. That massive purchase agreement dedicated 22.2 billion dollars of taxpayer money to buy nine—and potentially ten—new attack submarines. It was a big story. But the bigger story is the American taxpayer has gotten, in effect, up to three new submarine classes for the price of one.
Looked at as a class, the extensive evolution of the Virginia class submarine has been remarkable. A Block V Virginia will be a very different animal than the original Virginia Class subs. Adding more than eighty feet of length, the new subs will employ Virginia Payload Modules that can increase each sub’s Tomahawk strike capacity by about 76% and enable the boat to carry uncrewed undersea vehicles or other gear. In effect, the mission sets between the first of the Virginia subs and the Block V subs will be very different. It should be a different class.
Change is a constant in naval shipbuilding; any new naval ship is a bit different from the one built before. The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, a massive super-class of 67 commissioned ships that were built over three decades, has changed a lot throughout four flights—but it is still the same ship. The Los Angeles class attack submarine, a predecessor to the Virginia class, added vertical launch tubes and other upgrades in later production flights. But the Virginia class is something else, a modern-day “Ship of Theseus,” where components and parts of the original have been replaced to the point where observers would be forgiven for wondering if the new Block V submarines are still actually Virginia class subs.
Somehow, the original USS Virginia (SSN 774), a low-cost littoral stopgap of a sub, has become a slimmed-down spinoff of America’s Cold War-era Seawolf-class submarine. That, in itself, is a technological feat worth studying and—potentially—celebrating.
New subclasses are opportunities to emphasize America's technical and military progress
ASSOCIATED PRESS
How Has the Virginia Class Changed?
The Virginia class submarine was one of the first U.S. military products of the post-Cold War era. America’s last Cold War submarine, the Seawolf-class sub, was a big bruiser built to attack Soviet undersea bastions. The Seawolf program was cut after just three submarines were built, costing taxpayers over $24 billion in 2018 dollars.
The Virginia class was meant to be the more economical, low-cost alternative. As a smaller boat, with a smaller crew, fewer weapons, and other reduced capabilities, the Virginia Class has been upgraded and tweaked ever since.
The first ten Block I and II submarines are the same design. The next eight “Block III” boats, however, had a redesigned bow. With a new sonar array and large diameter vertical payload tubes, over twenty percent of the sub was redesigned. The last Block III, the USS Delaware (SSN 791) will be commissioned into the fleet in early 2020. The next ten “Block IV” boats, under construction today, made changes that reduced fabrication and operating expenses. But the new Block V boats, by adding the payload tubes and making other changes, induced another 20 percent change in the overall Virginia class design.
When the Block V boats enter the fleet, almost half of the Virginia class submarine will have been re-crafted.
In essence, the Block I and II, the Flight III and IV and the Block V boats could conceivably be treated as three separate classes. That is pretty amazing. Few navies—at least in modern history—have the capability to change over forty percent of an original design and still characterize it as a single class. But the Virginia class has managed to absorb the change, evolving from a cheap attack submarine to something of a mini guided-missile boat, or maybe a thinner, less robust version of the USS Jimmy Carter (a specialized final variant of the Seawolf).
A somewhat tattered USS Hawaii returns from deployment
What Does It Mean?
First, the continuous variation in Virginia class submarine design has helped the U.S. prepare for the Columbia class ballistic missile submarine. By quietly changing the overall Virginia class design, the U.S. Navy and America’s submarine industrial base has kept America’s fragile cadre of sub designers active and gainfully employed.
It is somewhat counterintuitive. Every shipbuilder wants a big block buy that offers stable, steady production work. But in a block buy, the primary effort shifts from the design to production, so designers are often relegated to making small changes that largely only enhance production efficiency. So, while the shipyard is happily churning out ships or subs, designers can easily become redundant and can be the first to be fired when a shipyard runs into a cost overrun or managers want to tighten operational margins.
The last thing conventional shipyard bosses want to do is to make big design changes. But by integrating constant improvements and forcing significant design changes into follow-on block buys, the Navy—in conjunction with General Dynamics—has done an admirable job of keeping America’s fragile submarine design community intact and relatively healthy. That said, the constant focus on design has, potentially, allowed pesky engineering challenges to persist. The problem the Virginia class has had with hull coatings has been a decade-long technical irritant, and the technical fixes have been far too slow in coming.
Another reason why the Virginia class has not been differentiated into separate classes is that new sub or ship classes, as new “programs of record,” can become expensive endeavors. If the Virginia class production run had been split into two or even three new classes, the subs would be forced to work through rigorous and expensive testing and validation programs that naval “variants” often do not need to complete. New programs breed new bureaucracies, with each new class needing their training schemes, supply-bases and other redundancies.
While variants have worked well for the Virginia class, the time-consuming and expensive bureaucratic requirements that face new programs may discourage innovation and incentivize the Navy to keep older platforms in service longer than is prudent. Put bluntly, the Pentagon’s pathological fear of a “new start” may encourage the development of sub-optimal solutions to avoid testing and trial requirements inherent in a “new” platform.
There is something of a prestige factor in developing new vessel or submarine classes—even if there is not an enormous amount of difference, new classes imply to both domestic and international audiences that U.S. technology is advancing in a way that “variants” do not.
To be frank, the Block V Virginia subs should be a class of their own. They have more in common with the Ohio class guided missile submarines, or SSGNs—a high-demand, utilitarian source of guided-missile firepower, unmanned platforms and commandos—than with the average attack sub. America’s SSGNs have a long operational legacy, tracing back from converted Benjamin Franklin and Ethan Allen class missile boats with their operational origins stemming from converted World War II-era Balao class troop-carrying subs, USS Perch (ASSP 313) and USS Sealion (ASSP 315). It is time to recognize these specialized guided missile-capable, commando and unmanned platform-carrying submarines as their platforms, with separate mission sets and operational expectations.
Differentiation is not a bad thing. The idea that America’s submarine manufacturers have generated, essentially, three new subclasses in the space of twenty years—while speeding production and designing the new Columbia class ballistic missile sub—is inspiring. That feat of engineering deserves a bit more attention. Had the Navy been more aggressive in differentiating the Virginia class into other, new, “classes,” America would not be expecting the worst from first-in-class ships, but, instead, turning to the Virginia class and two other new submarine classes and saying, “yeah, new ship classes are hard, but American shipbuilders can do it.” That sort of positive message, in these tough and cynical days, carries more strategic importance than ever.
Nuclear deterrent still the US Navy’s top priority, no matter the consequences, the top officer says
By: David B. Larter
The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine Pennsylvania returns to its homeport at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, Wash., following a strategic deterrent patrol. The Navy must start retiring the Ohio-class by the beginning of the 2030s, no matter the impact on its shipbuilding budget, its top officer says. (Petty Officer 1st Class Amanda Gray/U.S. Navy)
WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy’s new top officer is doubling down on the service’s commitment to field the new generation of nuke-launching submarines.
Adm. Michael Gilday, who assumed office as the chief of naval operations in August, visited General Dynamics Electric Boat in Quonset Point, Rhode Island, on Tuesday. He reiterated in a release alongside the visit that the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine remains the Navy’s top priority.
“The Navy’s first acquisition priority is recapitalizing our Strategic Nuclear Deterrent — Electric Boat is helping us do just that,” Gilday said. “Together, we will continue to drive affordability, technology development, and integration efforts to support Columbia’s fleet introduction on time or earlier.”
The service has been driving toward fielding the Columbia’s lead ship by 2031, in time for its first scheduled deployment. Construction of the first boat will begin in October 2020, though the Navy has been working on components and design for years.
Two generations of submariner CNOs have emphasized Columbia as the service’s top priority. Gilday has made clear that having a surface warfare officer in charge has not changed the service’s focus.
Five takeaways: The US Navy’s new top officer issues his orders
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday issued his orders to the fleet, calling on the service to drive toward new war-fighting concepts, high-tech training, and driving down the cost of defending the fleet.
By: David Larter
In comments at a recent forum, Gilday said that everything the Navy is trying to do to reinvent its force structure around a more distributed concept of operations — fighting more spread out instead of aggregated around an aircraft carrier — would have to be worked around the Columbia class, which will take up a major part of the service’s shipbuilding account in the years to come.
“It’s unavoidable,” Gilday said, referring to the cost of Columbia. “If you go back to the ’80s when we were building Ohio, it was about 35 percent of the shipbuilding budget. Columbia will be about 38-40 percent of the shipbuilding budget.
“The seaborne leg of the triad is critical. By the time we get the Columbia into the water, the Ohio class is going to be about 40 years old. And so we have to replace that strategic leg, and it has to come out of our budget right now. Those are the facts.”
The U.S. Navy is trying to revamp its concept of operations away from clumping ships around aircraft carriers. (MC3 Zachary Pearson/U.S. Navy)
The latest assessment puts the cost of the 12 planned Columbia-class subs at $109 billion, according to the Congressional Research Service.
Having nearly 40 percent of the shipbuilding budget dominated by one program will impact the force, which will force the Navy to get creative, the CNO said.
“I have to account for that at the same time as I’m trying to make precise investments in other platforms,” he explained. "Some of them will look like what we are buying today, like [destroyer] DDG Flight IIIs, but there is also an unmanned aspect to this. And I do remain fairly agnostic as to what that looks like, but I know we need to change the way we are thinking.”
Renewed push for 355
While the 12-ship Columbia-class project is set to eat at 40 percent of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget for the foreseeable future, acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly has renewed calls to field a 355-ship fleet.
The 355-ship goal, the result of a 2016 force-structure assessment, was written into national policy and was a stated goal of President Donald Trump.
“[Three hundred and fifty-five ships] is stated as national policy,” Modly told an audience at the USNI Defense Forum on Dec. 5. “It was also the president’s goal during the election. We have a goal of 355, and we don’t have a plan for 355. We need to have a plan, and if it’s not 355, what’s it going to be, and what’s it going to look like?”
“We ought to be lobbying for that and making a case for it and arguing in the halls of the Pentagon for a bigger share of the budget if that’s what is required,” Modly added. “But we have to come to a very clear determination as to what [355 ships] means, and all the equipment we need to support that.” In a memo, he said he wants the force to produce a force-structure assessment to get the service there within a decade.
Modly went on to say that the Navy’s new Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment, while will incorporate Marine Corps requirements, should be presented to him no later than Jan. 15, 2020. The Navy plans to look at less expensive platforms to reach its force-structure goals, which will likely include unmanned systems. But Congress has shown some reluctance to buy into the concept because of the sheer number of unknowns attached to fielding large and medium-sized crewless surface vessels.
The newly released National Defense Authorization Act halved the number of large uncrewed surface vessels requested by the service, and skepticism from lawmakers toward the Navy’s concepts appears unlikely to abate by the next budget cycle.
That means the ten large uncrewed surface vessels or LUSV, and the Navy programmed over the next five years seem unlikely to materialize at that rate. The Navy envisions the LUSV as an autonomous external missile magazine to augment the larger manned surface combatants.
But the drive to field less expensive systems to execute a more distributed concept of operations in large areas such as the Asia-Pacific region is being pushed at the highest levels of the government. In his comments at the Reagan National Defense Forum over the weekend, Trump’s national security adviser said the military must rethink how it buys its equipment.
“Spending $13 billion on one vessel, then accepting delivery with elevators that don’t work and are unusable is not acceptable,” O’Brien told the audience, referring to the troubled aircraft carrier Ford.
“The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy are clear: We must be ready for an era of prolonged peacetime competition with peer and near-peer rivals like Russia and China. ... The highest-end and the most expensive platform is not always the best solution.”
Thanks, Bud
John Bud Cunnally ETC (SS) Ret. USN – President
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